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THE EFFECTS OF DELIBERATE VAGUENESS,
ORDER OF AGREE-DISAGREE ISSUES, SOURCE CREDIBILITY,
AND TIMS ON RECEIVER AGREEMENT AND RECALL
INTRODUCTION, RATIONALE, AND PURPOSE
One of the most widely acknowledged truisms in the 
area of persuasive communication is the necessity of 
audience analysis. The speaker must weigh the beliefs, 
attitudes, and values of the audience, levels of under­
standing, and past learning experiences if he expects to 
be effective in instigating change, be it attitudinal or 
behavioral. In like manner, rhetoricians since antiquity 
have also advised speakers to always seek clarity in their 
speaking and to avoid the use of ambiguity or vagueness. 
Aristotle contended that "style to be good must be clear"
(Rhetoric. p. 65^), and Quintilian insisted that "above all 
we must avoid ambiguity" (Institutes of Oratory. p. 83).
This traditionally accepted tenet still survives, and many 
contemporary speech texts continue to call for a style which 
is always straightforward, addressing all issues clearly 
(Scheidel, 1972; Pace and Boren, 1973).
While our quest for clarity and language exactness 
has served a useful function, it seems that we have been
1
2victimized by two major misconceptions» equating untruthful­
ness with ambiguity and confusing ambiguity in informative 
speaking with ambiguity in persuasive speaking. To encode 
a vague message is not necessarily to encode a lie or 
untruthful statement. Indeed, vagueness is not even a 
necessary condition for lying to occur, for there are many 
lies which explicitly identify their referents. It has 
apparently been overlooked that all words contain some 
degree of vagueness, and instead of being inherently bad, 
vagueness, like rhetoric, appears to be an amoral means 
which can be applied to produce many different ends. In a 
similar manner, we have confused the issue of whether or not 
ambiguity is a legitimate rhetorical technique by inappro­
priately imposing standards of information dissemination on 
messages which are more persuasion oriented. In those 
communication situations where the emphasis is strictly on 
the efficient transmission of bits of information from point 
one to point two it does not make any sense to purposefully 
encode a vague message. In this situation the classical 
rhetorician's demand for absolute clarity is well taken; 
however, a problem arises when we apply this principle 
indiscriminately to all forms of communication, particularly 
to persuasive communication. Among others, Alston (196?) 
contends that there are certain contexts where we are better 
off using terms that are vague rather than using terms that 
are specific, and he cites politics as a prime example.
3Politicians and diplomats have practiced the art of equivoca­
tion for centuries, for they have found that success in politics 
often depends on keeping the opposition guessing and in leaving 
open a wide range of alternatives. George Gerbner states,
"It is a political necessity to engage in calculated ambiguity 
in the use of symbols so that different constituent groups 
may derive different types of gratification from the symbol" 
(Thayer, 196?, p. 477). The question is not whether a diplomat 
should use purposefully vague language, rather can he afford 
not to.
It is ironic that our discipline should prescribe so 
absolutely that all forms of vagueness be avoided and at the 
same time contend that we should consider all those variables 
which might influence the communication process. Unfortunately 
there is a major void between our theoretical concern for 
ambiguity and the reality of how many people actually use 
this technique in their everyday communication. Modern 
rhetoricians and communication researchers have done very 
little in terms of investigating purposeful vagueness, with 
our closest attempts being studies of language adaptation 
and style; however, it would appear that a variable as 
persistent as verbal vagueness should receive more than a 
casual consideration.
This study is an attempt to better understand the use 
of deliberate vagueness in those communication situations 
where the speaker must address an audience which openly and
4perhaps vehemently disagrees with him on certain issues. The 
speaker is faced with the problem of choosing a strategy which 
will maximize the probability of his success in terms of 
immediate as well as long-term responses. Given this situa­
tion, he has several options. Perhaps the simplest resolu­
tion to the problem would be to avoid confrontation and 
misunderstanding altogether by not even addressing the 
audience. Another possibility would be to give the speech 
but to completely ignore all issues which hold the potential 
for disagreement. These two approaches are commonly used 
and are often effective; however, they are rather limited in 
their application to certain circumstances. In the political 
arena where this strategy dilemma typically occurs, public 
officials are expected to make public appearances and deal 
with the important issues confronting their constituents,
To constantly avoid the issues would be a dereliction of 
political responsibility,
A third possible strategy would be for the speaker to 
take the traditional advice of many rhetoricians and clearly 
address all issues, completely unfolding the intricacies of 
his position regardless of the nature of the audience. But 
this approach would probably be disastrous since it would 
more than likely alienate many in the audience, encouraging 
hostility from some, and possibly contribute to a loss in 
speaker credibility,
A fourth alternative for the speaker addressing a
5disagreeing audience would be to use deliberate vagueness. 
According to this strategy the speaker clearly addresses 
those issues which he feels are acceptable to the audience 
and equivocates those issues with which they disagree. This 
strategy is not necessarily a persuasive device used to 
produce changes in tne audience. Instead it is viewed as a 
stalling strategy which at best will slightly improve the 
status of the speaker and at worst prevent a loss in credibil­
ity or maintain an uncommitted audience predisposition. The 
speaker cannot depend on equivocation for ultimate attitude 
change, but he may use it strategically to avoid initial 
negative audience responses which might damage future persua­
sive attempts. By using equivocation the speaker is better 
prepared for subsequent persuasive encounters, perhaps more 
personal in nature, where the issues may be presented in 
clearer detail and where the listener is considered on more 
of a one-to-one basis.
There is a limited amount of research in the field of 
speech communication which supports the use of deliberate 
vagueness. In a rhetorical case study of Prime Minister 
Gladstone's handling of the Irish home rule debates of 1886 
in the British House of Commons, Hufford (1962) discovered 
that Gladstone's vagueness throughout the campaign was profit­
able to his cause and produced no detrimental effects on 
society. Gladstone had notable success with the technique and 
his cause suffered on only two occasions, both being situa-
6tions where his position was very clearly stated in public. 
Based on these findings, Hufford concludes that we should 
modify our traditional idea that clarity be a constant aim 
of speaking and that ambiguity always be avoided.
James Roever (I962) has presented a similar point of 
view in his argument for a more serious analysis of vagueness. 
He states, . through the use of purposeful ambiguity,
we can satisfy various needs of various individuals when they 
are in the same audience" (p. 4). According to his interpreta­
tion, such a strategy would contain high levels of abstraction 
with very little referent specificity. The inferred meanings 
would be left entirely up to the audience.
In a more recent experimental study of equivocation as 
a rhetorical strategy, Goss and Williams (1973) found that 
equivocating issues which the audience disagrees with can 
positively effect the speaker's character ratings. It was 
theorized that equivocation tends to suppress incongruent 
meanings to the point where the listener calls up only 
congruent interpretations, and by interpreting the message 
as congruent with his attitudes the listener judges the 
speaker more favorably. The authors concluded, ”, . . equivo­
cation seems to have its place in persuasion, and with con­
tinued efforts we will be able to specify its role more fully"
(p. 167),
Following the initiative generated by these prior 
investigations, this study explores in more detail the
7possibility that the use of deliberate vagueness under 
certain circumstances can be an effective and useful 
rhetorical strategy.
CHAPTER I
REVIEW OP THE LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
In order to determine the specific effects produced 
from exposure to equivocated messages we must incorporate the 
findings of a large body of research if a full and comprehen­
sive understanding of deliberate vagueness is to be established, 
While a variety of theoretical positions could be considered, 
there are three main areas of research which appear to 
contribute most significantly to an understanding of equivo­
cation. First is the literature investigating information 
processing and the recall of word lists done by psychologists 
interested in verbal learning. A second area of concern is 
the persuasion literature dealing with attitude change and 
the effects of source credibility. A final area of interest 
which has the potential for making theoretical contributions 
to our understanding of equivocation is research investigating 
the long-term recall of more complex messages such as speeches 
and written statements.
The purpose of this chapter is to relate these differ­
ent areas of research in an effort to generate a variety of 
research questions and hypotheses about the effects of
8
9deliberate vagueness as it functions in the presence of 
other communication variables. Before considering this 
literature, however, it is necessary first to clarify the 
meanings of several key terms.
Defining Ambiguity. Vagueness, 
and Equivocation
There is considerable confusion regarding the 
distinguishing characteristics of ambiguity, vagueness, 
and equivocation, and frequently the research literature 
uses these terms interchangeably. They are not synonymous, 
however, and even though they share common traits, each 
contains an individuality which allows us to differentiate 
between them.
In general, these terms indicate some form of 
uncertainty or imprecision. Philosophers and linguists 
have traditionally been concerned with verbal uncertainty, 
specifically in terms of its inevitable presence in all words 
and in the problem it creates in the logical analysis of 
philosophical concepts. Bertrand Russell (1923) has presented 
a classical discussion on vagueness, and Black (1937)* Hempel 
(1939)» Wittgenstein (1953)* and Alston (1964) have also made 
noteworthy contributions to the analysis of vagueness. These 
investigations provide a conceptual basis for differentiating 
the various kinds of verbal uncertainty* and the issues which 
have emerged from these philosophical discussions serve a 
fundamental role in our understanding of the referential 
domain of these three terms.
10
An ambiguous term is one which has two or more rather 
distinct and clear areas of reference; however, the choice 
between the alternative referents is in question. For example, 
the word "star" may refer to a glowing object in the sky, a 
geometrical figure with five points, or the principal member 
of a theatrical production. The fields of reference are 
distinct, but it is not clear which meaning should be chosen. 
The listener must depend on the context of the word, both in 
the sentence and the situation, in making this choice,
A vague word is one which has one field of reference 
but the extent of its boundaries is in question. When the 
outer parameters of the meaning of a word are fuzzy and 
flexible there is room for a broad or narrow range of inter­
pretations depending on the individual perceiving the message. 
For example, how old is middle-aged? Perhaps we would agree 
that a person 50 years old is middle-aged, but what about a 
person 40, or one 6o years old? We could probably agree that 
ages 20 and 80 are not middle-aged, but we would have diffi­
culty agreeing on the boundary ages for the term "middle-aged," 
With vagueness the issue is one of precision, whereas with 
ambiguity the issue is one of accuracy, and while there is 
some vagueness in all words, not all terms are ambiguous; 
that is, not all words have different and distinct fields of 
reference.
The final term to be defined is equivocation. Very 
simply, equivocation is being deliberately vague. By choosing
11
words which have flexible boundaries and a wide range of
interpretation, a speaker allows listeners to react in a
way which suits them best and to supply whatever referents
they feel belong in the range covered by the equivocated
phrase. The goal of equivocation is to avoid offending
people, to minimize alienation, and to avert a loss in
credibility. Dealing more specifically with the nature of
equivocation, Goss (1971a) indicates*
Equivocation implies connotative agreement and 
referential disagreement, We both will agree a 
thing is good, but what precisely the thing is, 
we may disagree on and never know that we disagree. 
Connotatively we agree, denotatively we think we 
understand but don't realize that we may not.
The success of a speaker's equivocation depends 
on the ease with which the respondent can attach 
a meaning and on the respondent's failure to 
notice the vagueness of the message. The respon­
dent should never question the clarity of the 
message (p. 15).
Therefore, we may conclude that even though these 
three terms have similarities, each identifies a specific 
kind of verbal uncertainty and possesses a distinguishable 
set of characteristics.* This study is concerned specif-
*Many of the studies referenced in this review of the 
literature use the terms ambiguity, vagueness, and equivoca­
tion interchangeably. Often the reading is confounded by 
finding what one author calls ambiguity another author calls 
vagueness. Their meanings are the same but the terminology 
differs. In an effort to minimize this confusion, this study 
places the emphasis on how these terms are conceptually and 
operationally presented in the literature instead of how they 
are tagged. For the remainder of this investigation these 
terms will be used consistently in keeping with the definitions 
presented above. Whenever necessary, the terminology employed 
by certain authors has been recoded so as to correspond with 
these definitions.
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ically with equivocation, also referred to as deliberate 
vagueness or purposeful vagueness. Given certain circum­
stances, a vaguely encoded message might be a very 
effective rhetorical strategy for the speaker; however, 
since very little research has directly focused on this 
variable, we must consider a wide assortment of research 
findings which presently exist in the literature in 
hopes of generating theoretical statements and testable 
hypotheses about equivocation. The first research area 
to be considered is the investigation of information 
processing.
Word List Research Investigating
Information Processing and Recall
In recent years there has been an increased interest 
in understanding how man processes, stores, and retrieves 
information. While some investigations have looked at this 
processing behavior in general, the majority of the research 
has focused on how the individual learns lists of words and 
how those words are recalled from long-term memory (Tulving 
and Donaldson, 1972). A variety of theoretical positions 
have been employed, some endorsing more of an associationist 
approach (Wood and Underwood, 196?), some identifying with an 
organizational or reconstructionist position (Mandler, 1972), 
and some borrowing freely from both of these approaches to 
produce more of an eclectic orientation (Postman, 1972).
These researchers agree that man has a limited capacity for 
processing and retaining information, and through the organiza­
13
tion of this input material he equips himself with a means 
for handling large amounts of data. They differ, however, 
as to the nature of this organization and how it facilitates 
memory. According to the strong principle, "organization 
is absolutely necessary if memory is to exceed the limit of 
individual items that the system can deal with at any one 
time" (Mandler, 19&7, p. 331)» By subjectively recoding the 
input into new and larger chunks, memory is improved since 
the individual recalls a limited number of chunks and their 
contents instead of discrete pieces of information. In con­
trast, the weak principle contends that while organization 
possibly aids memory, factors such as the association of 
semantic, phonetic, and serial components also facilitate 
memory. Despite their differences, these varying interpreta­
tions agree more than they contradict or challenge each other. 
In general, they operate from the basic contention that each 
individual develops a fundamental set of associative and 
categorical structures, and given any message there is an 
optimal organization of that material which will maximize 
understanding and recall.
While there is no single information processing model 
which is generally accepted by word list researchers, the 
majority of them commonly agree that concepts and relations 
are the primary units of analysis in the human memory system 
(Fillmore, 1968, 1969» Kintsch, 1972» Rumelhart, Lindsay, 
and Norman, 1972» Bower, 1972» Collins and Quillian, 1972).
14
Of special interest is the work by Rumelhart, Lindsay, and 
Norman (1972) who have developed a processing model of long­
term memory presented in the form of a computer retrieval 
system which simulates human memory. These authors contend 
that the two basic elements in man's information system are 
nodes and relations. Nodes are the total body of knowledge 
a person possesses at any given point in time. They are 
clusters of information which represent concepts, events, 
and episodes experienced by the individual. Relations link 
nodes together, with each relation having a name and specify­
ing a direction. They are used by the memory system to 
encode logical and semantic associations among nodes, and 
any two nodes may have one or several multidirectional 
relations.
According to Rumelhart, Lindsay, and Norman (1972) and 
some additional research by Norman and Rumelhart (1970), over 
time an individual develops a semantic discrimination system. 
On the basis of a few initially learned primitive concepts, 
a semantic retrieval network is built up which compares each 
new input against items currently in storage. Certain mate­
rial is permanently retained while other material is tempo­
rarily processed through short-term memory and then forgotten. 
Whenever an input enters the, short-term memory system (either 
old or new information), if it is found to share some semantic 
attribute with an existent concept within the system, and if 
the material is deemed important, it is integrated into the
15
concept. If only some of the input attributes are held in 
common, the existent concept is subdivided to form two 
concepts. The original concept retains the common attributes 
and the other concept contains the unique attributes. There 
may be one or several subdivisions depending on how many 
different dimensions the individual perceives. With repeated 
exposure and depending on the stability of the established 
concepts, a set of long-term memory concepts of a semi­
permanent nature are formed. These serve as the basic, 
fundamental core of interacting categories the individual 
uses to understand and cope with his environment.
The research investigating the free recall of lists 
of words has also produced rather conclusive evidence that 
long-term retention is greatly dependent on the cues estab­
lished during initial exposure to the stimulus (Mandler, 
Pearlstone, and Koopmans, 1969; Thomson and Tulving, 1970; 
Tulving and Osier, 1968; Tulving and Pearlstone, 1966;
Weist, 1970). If the input is not meaningfully structured 
during acquisition it does not readily lend itself for sub­
sequent recall. The analogy is often made between elements 
within memory and books in a library. A book is lost if 
there is no index to indicate its location, and in like 
manner an item in memory is lost if there is no logic to 
guide its retrieval (Broadbent, 1973; Norman, I969). There 
are several characteristics of the message which facilitate 
this logic. Perhaps the most dominant of these is hierarchi-
16
cal organization, often referred to as semantic structuring 
(Miller, 1956; Bower, Clark, Lesgold, and Winzenz, 1969;
Tulving, 1962). If a label such as a category name is 
attached to a higher-order unit, then that label can serve 
as a potential retrieval cue for the individual components 
in the unit (Tulving, 1964; Tulving and Pearlstone, I96 6;
Kintsch, 1970). The order of presentation of the input list 
also tends to effect recall, especially in the single-trial 
free recall situation (Bower, 1968; Kintsch, I968). Related 
to this research on the order of presentation is the finding that 
subjects tend to adopt experimenter imposed organization and 
use it in recall (Tulving and Patkau, I96 2). Other factors 
which have been found to aid recall are repeated exposures 
using a consistent order of input (Lachman and Laughery, I9 68; 
Mandler and Dean, 1969; Postman, Bums, and Hasher, 1970), 
mnemonic devices such as pegwords (Wood, 1967; Senter and 
Hauser, I968), syntactic or generative rules (Voss, 1972;
Bower, 1972), and formal traits of the message such as 
visual or auditory similarities (Voss, 1972). Bower (1972) 
summarizes this literature by contending that the adult 
learner has available to him a variety of strategies for 
storing any material he casually encounters or is required 
to memorize. The most common and general strategy is to see 
whether the new material is in some way close to something 
already known. In his desire to expend the least effort 
possible and still accomplish the task, the information
17
processor seeks to impose something known on that which is 
unknown, thus providing an understanding of the stimulus and 
creating a cue for recall.
While the studies investigating word list memory have 
provided us with much new information, there are some rather 
severe limitations to this type of research. First, most of 
these studies operate on the basic assumption that the 
learner is an active and involved information processor; 
however, under normal living conditions we probably fluctuate 
greatly in terms of our attention and concern for various 
types of stimuli. Subjects may not process material where 
there are explicit instructions and cues that the items are 
to be memorized in the same manner in which they passively 
observe everyday situations. Also, the typical memory 
experiment is usually one where there are repeated trials 
instead of a single exposure. More needs to be known about 
retention, storage, and recall under these limited exposure 
situations, A final weakness of this type of research con­
cerns the nature of the unit of analysis. Since most of the 
word list research focuses on words instead of phrases or 
sentences, syntactical relationships as well as affective 
influences tend to be neglected. Some studies have looked 
at recall on the basis of serial order, but very few have 
taken the sentence or an abstract idea as the basic recall 
unit. In like manner, most studies investigating word recall 
have been more concerned with denotative or functional
18
relationships rather than pursuing retention on the basis 
of attitudinal agreement or disagreement with the message.
We must look beyond the word list experiments if we are to 
receive answers to these additional concerns,
A Reconceptualization of the Persuasion 
Literature Based on the Nature of the Message
In an effort to better understand equivocation, we 
may employ the findings of word organization and recall 
studies to pose three basic response alternatives avail­
able to the information processor who perceives a message. 
First, he could accept the message he sees or hears. If 
the contents of the message are familiar and fit existent 
concepts, the information is integrated with a. minimum 
amount of effort. If the contents are familiar but 
restructured in such a way as to expose new relation­
ships, or if it is new and unfamiliar material but not 
far removed from previously learned concepts, the message 
may be assimilated by the receiver. This process requires 
more effort, but it is one which is easily accomplished,
A second possibility for the information processor 
who encounters a message would be for him to reject it.
If the contents are familiar but do not fit the individual's 
subjective categories they may be immediately disposed of 
and not allowed to interfere with the established coping 
mechanisms. The same response might occur with old 
information which has been reconstructed to produce a
19
new awareness or with completely new information not 
previously encountered. In addition, the individual 
might go so far as to contrast the undesirable input, 
viewing it as extreme and radical in an effort to avert 
disruption to the category system.
As a final alternative, the information processor 
might change his concepts as a result of exposure to the 
message. We might consider this to be the typical persua­
sive event, where the concepts of an individual are subdivided 
and the new material becomes an integral part of the semantic 
network. Such a response might occur if old information is 
reconstructed so as to produce a new concept or if completely 
new information is given. In effect, the changing of a 
concept is a special case of acceptance, with the primary 
differences being the degree of effort and the nature of the 
category change. With acceptance the input is simply incor­
porated into the system with no fundamental changes being 
made in the concepts or linking relations. With change, 
however, there is more effort involved since there is a 
relinquishing of the old concepts, and the memory system 
takes on fundamentally different components. Here the 
emphasis is placed on the creation of new concepts rather 
than simply identifying with those previously held.
These three response alternatives and the situations 
where they are most likely to occur provide us with the 
basic categories for understanding some of the more recent
20
trends in information processing research; however, these 
categories have a more important function. There is a 
logical and fundamental relationship between this research 
and the attitude change, source credibility, ego involve­
ment, and recall concerns of social psychologists and commu- 
nicologists. Using the nature of the message as the basic 
model for structuring previous research, we may reconceptu- 
alize the persuasion literature and our view of persuasive 
effects as a special case of information processing. This 
exercise will hopefully generate new insights, provide an 
incorporation of previously separate areas of research, and 
produce meaningful theoretical applications to the study of 
equivocation. The review of the literature which follows 
takes as its point of departure three different types of 
messages. The receiver’s responses are analyzed on the 
basis of the message as it is experienced in the presence 
of additional influencing variables. The three types of 
messages are:
1, A clear message which is moderately to highly
discrepant with the receiver’s existing concepts,
2, A clear message which is neutral or slightly
discrepant with the receiver’s existing concepts,
3, A vague message which does not clearly identify
with the receiver’s concepts,
A Clearly Stated Message Containing 
Moderately to Highly Discrepant Information
If a clearly stated message which is not attributed
to any specific source is moderately to highly discrepant
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with the receiver's position, the message will most likely 
be rejected by the receiver and there will be little to no 
immediate attitude change. Studies by Hovland, Harvey, and 
Sherif (195?) and Manis (1961a) support this contention as 
well as indicate a contrast effect; that is, subjects per­
ceive the unidentified source as being further removed from 
their own position than what he actually is. In like manner, 
Manis (1961b) and Kelman and Eagley (1965) found an even 
greater contrast effect when the message was attributed to 
a low credible source.
Research also indicates that a highly discrepant 
message can produce immediate attitude change. For instance, 
if there is low ego involvement and if the message is attrib­
uted to a medium or high credible source, a linear relation­
ship exists between increased discrepancy and attitude change 
(Hovland and Pritzker, 1957» Rosenbaum and Franc, I960;
Aronson, Turner, and Carlsmith, 1963; Bochner and Insko, 1966), 
In contrast, if there is medium to low ego involvement and 
if the source is not identified or if he is of low credibili­
ty, a curvilinear relationship exists between increased dis­
crepancy and attitude change (Hairaan, 1949; Hovland and Weiss, 
1951; Cohen, 1959; Aronson, Turner, and Carlsmith, 1963; 
Freedman, 1964; Bochner and Insko, I966), There is no indi­
cation of a contrast effect under these conditions, however.
Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif (1957) explain these 
different findings primarily on the basis of involvement
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with the issues and credibility, but a different explanation
has been proposed by Aronson, Turner, and Carlsmith (I963)
in teinns of cognitive dissonance. They suggest:
• , . when an individual finds that an opinion 
advocated by a credible communicator is discrep­
ant from his own opinion he experiences disso­
nance. His cognition that he holds a particular 
opinion is dissonant with his cognition that a 
credible communicator holds a somewhat different 
opinion. The greater the discrepancy between 
his own opinion and the opinion advocated by the 
communicator, the greater the dissonance. Gener­
ally, a person might reduce his dissonance in at 
least four ways: he could change his own opin­
ion to bring it closer to that of the communi­
cator; change the communicator's opinion to bring 
it closer to his own opinion; seek support for 
his opinion by finding other people who hold 
similar opinions; derogate the communicator—  
that is, make the opinion of the communicator 
nonapplicable to his own by discounting the 
ability of the communicator to have a valuable 
opinion on the topic (pp. 31-32).
In most experimental situations the subject does not have an 
opportunity to try and influence the communicator, and since 
he is a member of a noninteracting audience he is unable to 
seek immediate social support. This means that in the typical 
experimental study the receiver may reduce his dissonance 
either by changing his opinion toward the message or derogat­
ing the source. The former condition prevails when the 
source is of relatively high credibility and the receiver 
changes his attitude in order to regain cognitive stability. In 
contrast, the latter condition is the more probable dissonance 
reducing alternative if the source is not named or if he is 
of low credibility.
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A Clearly Stated Message Containing 
Neutral or Slightly Discrepant Information
Under these circumstances and for an unspecified 
source, the most typical finding is for the subject to 
assimilate the message (Campbell, Hunt, and Lewis, 1937; 
Hovland, Harvey, and Sherif, 1957; Manis, 1961a; Sherif 
and Hovland, 1961; Dillehay, 1965). Emanating out of 
social judgment theory (Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall,
1965; Sherif and Sherif, 1967), assimilation occurs when 
a subject, in judging the messages of others, uses his 
own views as an anchor. When only a small discrepancy in 
positions exists, there is a tendency for displacement to­
ward his own stand; that is, if the message falls within 
or near the receiver's latitude of acceptance, whatever 
differences might exist are ignored and the point of view 
expressed in the message is distorted so as to conform to 
his beliefs. If the source of the message is a medium or 
highly credible individual, there is an even stronger tenden­
cy for assimilation to occur (Kelman and Eagley, 1965;
Bochner and Insko, I966),
There is also evidence indicating that the context 
surrounding the message, such as order of presentation and 
pre-sets, tends to affect the assimilation of information, 
Campbell, Hunt, and Lewis (1957) designed a study where 
subjects judged a series of nine messages in an effort to 
evaluate the source's degree of imbalance. In one group the 
order progressed from relatively normal responses to more
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disturbed responses, with the reverse order in the other 
group. Results indicated that the evaluators assimilated 
the latter messages in terms of the prior messages. These 
findings are explained by Kelson's (1964) adaptation theory 
which states as each stimulus is judged it becomes part of 
the context or anchor. With an ascending order of presenta­
tion each stimulus is judged against a background of pre­
viously experienced information, McGuire (1969) indicates 
that this primacy effect has quite commonly been found in 
impression formation research. Studies by Jones and Gerard 
(1967). N.H, Anderson (I965)» and McGinnis and Oziel (1970) 
all tend to support this assumption, especially when the 
initially presented material is perceived as being consistent 
and meeting prior expectations (Jones and Goethals, 1971). 
Additional research by Weiss (1957). Tannenbaum (I966), and 
Tannenbaum and Gengel (I966) indicates that an agree-disagree 
order tends to create a more positive view of the source 
since he is associated with initially agreeable issues.
According to the social judgment literature, a message 
falling in a receiver's latitude of rejection is one that 
becomes increasingly more discrepant with his beliefs. This 
could include a neutral message which is seen to be highly 
unacceptable. Under these conditions a contrast effect was 
originally predicted, but the research tends to indicate that 
this effect does not occur when the source is left unidenti­
fied (Dillehay, I965) or even when a low credible source is
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used (Manis, 1961b). An undesirable neutral message is 
usually rejected, but it is not contrasted. Finally with 
regard to clearly stated neutral statements, it should be 
mentioned that little to no attitude change is expected when 
a slightly discrepant or neutral message is given unless 
there is very little ego involvement and a highly credible 
source is used. This finding plus evidence showing tne 
extreme importance of ego involvement constantly reappears 
throughout the literature (Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall,
19651 Serene, 1969; Mortensen and Sereno, 1970; Johnson and 
Scileppi, 1969).
A Vague Message 
In most of the past research using vague messages the 
stimulus has been operationalized as either a vague visual 
object or a verbal message which does not clearly identify 
its referents. Sherif (1936) and Asch (1952) instigated 
some of the initial studies investigating how subjects per­
ceive visual stimuli which are vague or ambiguous in an effort 
to assess the effects of social influence. These studies 
indicate that even when confederates advocate highly discrep­
ant judgments, subjects tend to conform to the previously 
established group norm. In a more recent study by Insko, 
Murashima, and Saiyadain (1966) a variety of complexly arrang­
ed objects varying in size, shape, color, and spatial dis­
tribution were presented to groups of subjects. Discrepancy •
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was manipulated by having confederates describe the vague 
stimuli as containing many more objects than were actually 
present. The two experiments reported in this study offer 
strong support for the finding that in this conformity 
situation where numerous public judgments are taken, the 
relationship between discrepancy and influence is curvilinear. 
Results also indicated that the more vague the object of 
judgment the greater the influence of the discrepant message, 
and as the confederate's suggestions became more and more 
discrepant the very vague stimuli tended to influence subject 
agreement longer than did a less vague stimulus. The authors 
explained these findings both in terms of social judgment 
theory and dissonance theory. Emphasis was placed on the 
judgmental point of view which contends that vagueness oper­
ates so as to increase the latitude of acceptance, thus 
allowing for more assimilation and conformity to the discrep­
ant statements.
In recent years there has been an increase in the 
number of experimental studies investigating verbal vagueness. 
Samovar (19&2), using passages from the i960 Nixon-Kennedy 
debates, found that when subjects were asked to state what 
they thought the speaker was saying the vague messages evoked 
an average of 15»5 different interpretations while the clear 
messages produced an average of 6.6 different interpretations. 
A similar finding is reported by Goss (1971b) who found that 
clear nouns need less response time and generate more
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homogeneous responses than do ambiguous or vague nouns.
Wilson (1971) has also manipulated message vagueness, 
operationalizing it as levels of denotative abstraction with 
connotatively positive words. Using three levels of vague­
ness, he hypothesized: (1) the greater the degree of vague­
ness the more the message would be assimilated toward the 
receiver’s own position, (2) the greater xhe vagueness the 
higher the ratings of source credibility, and (3) there 
would be more attitude change with a highly vague message.
The last two hypotheses are based on the assumption that 
since a vague message should allow the receiver to assimilate 
the source’s position and therefore provide more support for 
his own views, the receiver should attribute more credibility 
to the source as well as have a more favorable attitude. The 
results did not support any of the hypotheses even though 
the moderate level of vagueness had a greater tendency to 
support the predicted differences than did the highly vague 
messages. In explaining these results Wilson acknowledged 
several weaknesses in the study, the primary problem being 
an inadequate operationalization of vagueness. It should 
also be noted that in this experimental manipulation all the 
messages addressed the same issue (one with which the subjects 
generally agreed). These nonsignificant findings might 
possibly indicate the overall ineffectiveness of using 
purposeful vagueness with messages which the audience finds 
agreeable.
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This reconceptualization of the persuasion litera­
ture based on the nature of the message has clarified 
several issues. It indicates that the nature of the message 
(clearly stated or vaguely stated message), the credibility 
of the speaker (high, low, or unspecified credibility) , 
as well as the degree of attitude discrepancy between the 
speaker and receiver (slightly, moderately, or highly 
discrepant) greatly effect the way the receiver processes 
information. Under certain circumstances the receiver is 
more disposed toward assimilating the message and under 
other conditions the probability of rejecting the message 
is increased. Perhaps the most significant finding with 
regard to vague messages is the observation that they 
generate more different interpretations than clear messages 
and that vague messages might be more effective with issues 
the audience disagrees with more than with agreeable issues. 
Before considering the specific research questions and 
hypotheses suggested by these findings, one final area of 
research needs to be considered.
The Recall of Complex Messages 
Over Time
In addition to the word list research, another body of 
research more closely associated with the persuasion litera­
ture has focused its attention on the recall of issues or 
ideas expressed in a speech or written message. Here the 
emphasis has been placed on the nature of more complex mes-
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sages, not just words, and their effects on long-term memory.
A question of central concern is* If the receiver hears a 
clearly stated message with which he disagrees, or one with 
which he agrees, or a vague message where the referents are 
not clearly identified, how well will that message be remem­
bered over time?
It should be initially clarified that there is more to 
forgetting than simply the passing of time. Other variables 
contribute to the forgetting of complex messages, as Manis 
(1966) and others have clearly demonstrated. For example, the 
intervention of new material tends to produce memory loss.
Most researchers have explained forgetting in terms of the 
decay of information over time, however, and the available 
research reveals wide spread agreement that there is decay 
not only in induced attitude change but also in the ability of 
the receiver to recall the message. McGuire (1957) found that 
about of the initial persuasive effect of a message decays 
after a week, and Watts and McGuire (1964) found that after six 
weeks about 60% of the message effect had decayed. Dealing 
more with the content of a message rather than attitudes, 
Bartlett’s (1932) results reveal that there is a qualitative 
change in retention over time, where the main points tend to 
stand out more clearly but the obscure details are forgotten.
Members of the "Yale group" have produced evidence to 
indicate that the source of a message and the contents of the 
communication become disassociated over time (Hovland and
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Weiss, 195I; Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, 1933)* This re­
search also indicates that credibility effects are short­
lived. When a message is attributed to a high credible 
source there is immediate attitude change, but this effect 
tends to disappear after several weeks. Similarly, when a 
message is associated with a low credible source there is a 
negative effect on attitude change, but over time this 
decrease in persuasion tends to vanish. This latter phenom­
enon is commonly known as the "sleeper effect," In addition 
to these findings, more recent research shows that attitude 
change produced by compliance decreases more rapidly over 
time than that which is internalized (Kelman, 1958» 1961), 
and attitude change is more persistent if the receiver 
actively participates in the persuasive communication 
(McGuire, 1964^ Watts, 196?),
While source credibility has been found to signifi­
cantly effect immediate attitude change, there is substantial 
evidence to indicate that credibility has almost no effect 
on learning or recalling the message (Hovland and Mande11, 
1952; L. Anderson, I966; Gibb, I966; King, I966; Johnson, 
Torcivia, Poprick, I968), In his review of the effects of 
source credibility, Littlejohn (1971) found that the recall 
literature supports this finding by a 13 to 1 ratio. Some 
studies even indicate that a message attributed to a neutral 
source or one where no source is given produces more learning 
than one where there is a high or low credible source
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(Kelman and Hovland, 1953i Rarick, 1962), Bauer (1965) 
supports this position contending that as long as the person 
evaluating a message knows the source is high or low in 
credibility he can evaluate the conclusion without paying 
attention to the arguments used. It is only when he is unable 
to evaluate the source that he must analyze the arguments 
themselves.
With regard to the issue of whether agree messages are 
remembered better than disagree messages, there are a variety 
of different findings. Some studies have shown that favorable 
messages are more likely to be recalled than those which the 
receiver opposes (Paulson, 195^; Carter, 1962; Katz and 
Feldman, 1962), other studies have shown there is no signif­
icant difference (Platt, 1964; Hughey, I969), and others have 
found that subjects tend to seek out and attend discrepant 
information (Canon, 1964; Mills and Ross, 1964). There is 
some indication that other variables such as implicit or 
explicit statements (Fine, 1957), the order of desirable and 
undesirable issues (McGuire, 1957; Tannenbaum, Macaulay, and 
Norris, 1966), and re-exposure to the message (Kelman and 
Hovland, 1953) might interact with the receiver’s disposition 
toward the message to produce increased recall. At present 
the research has not clarified these various effects, and more 
research is needed before these issues can be resolved.
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Research Questions and Hypotheses
Much of our initial research investigating human 
communication operated on the assumption that there were 
some rather broad lawlike statements we could make about 
man and that these generalizations could serve as the basis 
for accurately predicting communication behavior. As a 
result of recent research advances using more sophisticated 
techniques, however, we are becoming more and more aware of 
the complexity of human behavior, McGuire (I969) in his 
discussion of attitude studies indicates that in the past 
few years ther» has been a shift to formulating and testing 
interaction hypotheses instead of looking merely for main 
effects. Our emphasis is now being directed toward under­
standing how many different variables interact to produce a 
specific response, and researchers are using more complicated 
experimental designs which assess the effects of many factors 
instead of just one or two. In keeping with this research 
trend where many different variables are manipulated within 
a single design, the present study is an effort to more 
clearly comprehend how deliberate vagueness, source credibili­
ty, order of agree-disagree issues, and time interact to 
effect message agreement and recall.
With regard to agreement, prior research adequately 
demonstrates that since highly discrepant messages tend to 
be annoying to the information processor, clearly stated 
disagree issues presented by a low credible or unidentified
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source tend to be rejected or even contrasted by the receiver 
(Hovland, Harvey* and Sherif, 1957; Manis, 1961a, 1961b;
Kelman and Eagley, I965). Research also indicates that 
clearly stated disagree issues attributed to a highly credi­
ble source have little to no effect on agreement (Hovland 
and Pritzker, 1957; Rosenbaum and Franc, I96O; Aronson,
Turner, and Carlsmith, 1963; Bochner and Insko, 1966), The 
literature is not clear, however, as to the dominant factors 
which influence the acceptance of vaguely encoded disagree 
issues. One possibility is that the listener is more in­
clined to accept an equivocated message more than a clearly 
stated disagree message since he can infer the referents as 
he sees fit, using his predispositions and the surrounding 
circumstances as frames of reference. It could be that 
perceived source credibility plays an important role in this 
assimilation process; however, previous research has not ad­
dressed this possibility, A variety of questions are produced 
from this speculation: Is deliberate vagueness beneficial 
only to a high credible source, or does it also operate to the 
advantage of a low credible source? Is it always better to 
equivocate disagree issues regardless of your credibility, or 
is deliberate vagueness a technique which can be used only 
under certain circumstances?
Other questions are raised regarding agreement with 
equivocated issues and the attitudinal pre-set established by 
the first series of issues presented in the message. If the
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speaker initially identifies with the listener by presenting 
favorable issues, is the receiver more disposed toward 
assimilating subsequent equivocated issues, or is equivoca­
tion effective regardless of its position in the message?
Is there a combination of deliberate vagueness, source credi­
bility, and order of agree-disagree issues which tends to 
maximize audience agreement?
In addition, the variable of time might also be impor­
tant, Does deliberate vagueness benefit agreement with the 
message immediately after exposure, does it have a long-term 
effect, or is it equally effective immediately after exposure 
as well as after the passing of time? Is agreement influenced 
by a significant interaction between the equivocation of 
disagree issues, source credibility, and time, and if so, 
which combination of these variables facilitates agreement 
the most?
These are important research questions, but since no 
previous research has investigated these interactions, it is 
difficult to make precise predictions. For this reason, the 
present study must assume more of an exploratory nature. In 
terms of agreement, the overall research question is* What 
are the effects of deliberate vagueness, source credibility, 
order of agree-disagree issues, and time on agreement with 
the message? While a variety of port-hoc analyses are 
anticipated in an effort to answer this question, the follow­
ing hypotheses are also offered for testing:
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HI: There will be a significant interaction between
the degree of message vagueness and source 
credibility when message agreement is measured.
H2i There will be a significant interaction between
the degree of message vagueness, source credibility, 
and time when message agreement is measured.
These hypotheses are based on the assumption that 
given any speaking situation there is a particular type of 
message encoding which will maximize the speaker's success. 
While all symbolic messages exhibit some degree of vagueness, 
some messages specify their referents more clearly than do 
others. In terms of a rhetorical strategy, it is obvious 
that the speaker should clearly address those issues which 
the audience agrees with; however, research has not clearly 
demonstrated the advantage of clearly addressing disagree 
issues or equivocating disagree issues. The above hypotheses 
seek to clarify this issue by posing two degrees of message 
vagueness: one where both the agree issues and disagree 
issues are clearly addressed and the other where agree issues 
are clearly stated but disagree issues are equivocated.
The second major variable of interest to this study is 
message recall. The number of disagree issues a receiver can 
recall and the quality of recall are important concerns for 
the speaker anticipating the use of deliberate vagueness. A 
message containing clearly stated disagree issues might 
possibly be retained in memory and recalled over time, espe­
cially when the speaker or those issues are encountered at 
some later date. In addition, clearly stated disagree issues
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probably place the speaker on the defensive. Not only does 
he create a situation where he must defend disagreeable issues 
in subsequent communications but there is a tendency for the 
audience to become more actively involved in disagreeing with 
the speaker, an act which might produce strong memory asso­
ciations. Clearly addressing disagree issues might lead to 
a lowering of credibility, an increased potential for recall­
ing negative information, and a long-term negative predis­
position toward the speaker (since vividly imprinted disagree 
issues have been associated with the source). With equivoca­
ted disagree issues, however, the meanings should not be 
decoded as clearly by the receiver and thus should be forgot­
ten rather quickly. Here the speaker assumes more of an 
offensive role, and when addressing those disagree issues at 
a later date he will not have to correct or change unfavorable 
information the receiver might recall.
Many of the research questions raised in the discussion 
of agreement can also be asked about recall, with one major 
exception. In terms of recall, the review of the literature 
clearly demonstrates that source credibility is not as impor­
tant as it is with agreement (L, Anderson, 1966; Gibb, 1966; 
Johnson, Torcivia, Poprick, 1968; Littlejohn, 1971)• With 
recall, time and the nature of the message tend to be the 
dominant factors. Research indicates that messages which 
are organized and which contain cue words are more easily 
remembered (Mandler, Pearlstone, and Koopmans, I969; Thomson
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and Tulving, 1970; Tulving and Osier, 1968); thus, a clearly 
stated message where the referents are specifically identi­
fied should be easier to tag for retrieval than an equivocated 
message where the cues are vague and imprecise. It appears 
that initial exposure to the equivocated issues does not 
provide an adequate plan for retrieval which might be used 
later to facilitate recall. In addition, the order in which 
issues are presented might also influence recall, both in 
terms of the number of issues recalled and the quality of 
recall (McGuire, 1957» Tannenbaum, Macaulay, and Norris, 1966). 
A variety of research questions are generated from this 
speculation: Immediately after exposure to the message, are
the clearly stated disagree issues recalled better than 
equivocated disagree issues? Over time does a listener 
remember clearly stated disagree issues and equivocated 
disagree issues equally well, or is one remembered better 
than the other? Is recall dependent primarily on the amount 
of time between exposure to the message and recall, and/or 
is it dependent primarily on the order in which issues are 
presented? Is there a significant interaction between the 
vagueness of disagree issues, time, and the order of agree- 
disagree issues which effects memory recall?
In sum, the research question being proposed with 
regard to recall is: What are the effects of deliberate
vagueness, source credibility, order of agree-disagree issues, 
and time on the number of disagree issues recalled and on the
38
quality of disagree issues recalled? As before, post-hoc 
analyses are anticipated in hopes of clarifying this ques­
tion. In addition, the following hypotheses regarding recall 
are also offered for testing:
H3* There will be a significant interaction between
the degree of message vagueness and time when
amount of recall is measured.
H4; There will be a significant interaction between
the degree of message vagueness and time when
quality of recall is measured.
H5« There will be a significant interaction between
the degree of message vagueness, message order,
and time when amount of recall is measured.
h6: There will be a significant interaction between
the degree of message vagueness, message order,
and time when quality of recall is measured.
The following chapter presents the method of analysis 
used in investigating the relationships among these variables.
CHAPTER II 
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Details regarding the variables, design, procedures, 
and data analysis are individually discussed in this chapter.
Variables
This study investigated the effects of deliberate 
vagueness, order of agree-disagree issues, source credibili­
ty, and time on receiver agreement, the number of disagree 
issues recalled, and the quality of disagree issues recalled. 
The independent variables were operationalized in the follow­
ing manner. In terms of vagueness, two types of messages 
were encoded. One message consisted of three clearly stated 
agree issues and three clearly stated disagree issues, while 
the other message contained the same three clearly stated 
agree issues but equivocated the disagree issues. Following 
each issue a brief rationale or supporting statement for 
each of the respective issues was given (See Appendix A). 
Order of agree-disagree issues also contained two levels.
In one message the agree issues were placed at the first of 
the statement followed by the disagree issues, and in the 
other message the disagree issues were presented initially
39
4o
followed by the agree issues. Source credibility was 
manipulated by attributing the message to a high credible 
source, to a low credible source, or to an unidentified 
source. The final independent variable considered was time. 
The time one measure was taken immediately after exposure to 
the message, and the time two measure was taken approximately 
two weeks after exposure to the message.
Receiver agreement, the number of disagree issues 
recalled, and the quality of disagree issues recalled were 
the dependent variables of interest to this study. Agree­
ment with the message was measured by means of five bi-polar 
semantic differential type scales which are a modification 
of those used by McCroskey, Young, and Scott (1972). The 
five bi-polar scales used were* Strongly agree-Strongly 
disagree, Right-Wrong, Positive-Negative, Good-Bad, and 
Wise-Foolish. The number of disagree issues recalled was 
simply the sum of disagreeable issue* recalled, either equiv­
ocated disagree issues or clearly stated disagree issues 
dep'nding on which condition the subject received. Since 
there were three disagree issues in each message, a score on 
this recall index ranged from 0 to 3. The other recall mea­
sure was the quality with which disagree issues were recalled. 
As before, this measure was concerned only with the clearly 
stated or equivocated disagree issues. Each of the disagree 
issues were measured individually and given a score ranging 
from 0 to 5* Scores were then summed for each subject, and
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since there were three disagree issues per message, the 
range of the quality of recall index was from 0 to 15 
(See Appendix B).
Design
A four factor mixed design with one repeated factor 
was employed in this study. Message vagueness, order of 
agree-disagree issues, and source credibility were the fixed 
factors, and time served as the repeated factor. The effects 
of these four independent variables were assessed on message 
agreement, the number of disagree issues recalled, and the 
quality of disagree issues recalled. Each dependent variable 
was analyzed independently (See Illustration 1 for a layout 
of the design).
Procedures
Pre-tests
Ninety-seven undergraduate students enrolled in the 
fundamental speech communication course at the University of 
Oklahoma served as subjects in a series of pre-tests adminis­
tered in the spring semester of 1974. The pre-tests sought 
to determineI (1) the salience of several contemporary 
topics, (2) agreement and disagreement with issues related 
to those topics, (3) clear versus vague encodings of disagree 
issues, and (4) high and low credible sources.
Of the five contemporary topics tested, "What should 
be included in a liberal college education?" proved to be
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ILLUSTRATION 1 
LAYOUT OF DESIGN
Time 1 Time 2
Clearly Agree- 
Clearly Clearly Disagree 
Stated Order
Disagree Clearly Disagree- 
. Message Clearly Agree
Credible order
Source Clearly Agree-
Order
Clearly Agree- 
Clearly Clearly Disagree 
Stated Order
Disagree Clearly Disagree- 
T Message Clearly Agree
Credible Order
SoSroe Clearly Agree-
TAlrcc
Order
Clearly Agree- 
C1early Clearly Disagree 
Stated Order
Disagree Clearly bisagree- 
Message Clearly Agree 
Unidentified Order
Source Clearly Agree-
Order
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the most salient (See Appendix C). Individual measures of 
six issues regarding what should be included in a liberal 
college education revealed that subjects strongly agreed 
that social sciences courses should be included, with ethnic 
studies courses and mathematics courses receiving neutral 
to moderately high agreement. Subjects were found to uniform­
ly disagree that foreign language courses, A to F grading, 
and a strict schedule of required courses are needed for a 
liberal college education. Using terms from Hiller's (1968) 
dictionary of vague expressions, these three disagree issues 
were equivocated, and all three were found to be significantly 
more agreeable than the clearly stated disagree issues. It 
was also found that subjects did not perceive the equivocated 
issues as being significantly more vague than the clearly 
stated issues (See Appendix D). The final item pre-tested 
was source credibility. Of the eight sources tested, the 
results indicated that with regard to the liberal education 
topic, Paul Sharp was viewed as a high credible source and 
Curtis Harris was seen as a low credible source (See Appendix 
E).
Experimental Procedures 
Employing the information gained from the pre-tests, 
the actual experiment was conducted in the summer session of 
1974 with students enrolled in speech classes at the Univer­
sity of Oklahoma. Ten speech sections were used. Six sec­
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tions were freshman level speech classes, three were 
sophomore level speech classes, and one was a senior level 
speech class. Of the 155 subjects which were drawn from 
these sections, 128 completed all phases of the experiment 
and provided the data for analysis.
The study was presented in two parts. At the first 
session, one of fourteen different booklets was randomly 
distributed to the subjects. Twelve of the booklets con­
tained: (1) an introduction to the study which was posed
as a student survey on what should be included in a liberal 
college education, (2) the identification of a high credible 
source (Paul Sharp), low credible source (Curtis Harris), or 
unidentified source which was attributed to the message, 
followed by a brief statement about the source, and (3) the 
message where disagree issues were clearly stated or equivo­
cated and where the order of the issues was agree-disagree 
or disagree-agree (See Appendix F), After allowing approxi­
mately five minutes for the subjects to read through the 
booklet and to become familiar with the message, all booklets 
were collected. Sheets containing the dependent variables 
were then distributed and subjects were asked to* (1) indi­
cate on the agreement scale their feelings about the message 
they just read and (2) to recall as many of the issues in as 
much detail as possible (See Appendix G),
In addition to these experimental conditions, two 
booklets designed as a manipulation check were also randomly
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distributed to subjects, While each booklet asked the sub­
jects to evaluate the credibility of Paul Sharp and Curtis 
Harris on the topic of what should be included in a liberal 
college education, one booklet asked subjects to individually 
evaluate each of the clearly stated agree issues and clearly 
stated disagree issues, and the other booklet asked subjects 
to indiviudally evaluate the three clearly stated agree 
issues and the three equivocated disagree issues (See Appen­
dix H) •
The second session commenced approximately two weeks 
later. (All subjects completed the second part of the study 
either thirteen or fourteen days after the initial testing.) 
At this time all subjects were again asked to fill out the 
agreement measure and to recall the issues presented in the 
message on what should be included in a liberal college 
education (See Appendix I).
Data Analysis
The data were analyzed using an analysis of variance 
with three independent and one repeated factor. To achieve 
equal cell size, subjects were randomly removed from experi­
mental conditions until there were nine subjects per cell, 
thus producing a total N size of 108. (Before removing extra 
subjects from the various conditions, each of the twelve 
experimental groups contained a minimum of nine subjects and 
a maximum of eleven subjects.) Following the calculation of
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the fifteen F ratios produced from this mixed design, 
planned as well as post-hoc individual comparisons were 
run. Differences were considered significant at the .05 
level of significance.
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS
In this chapter the results of the manipulation check, 
the hypothesized findings, and unhypothesized findings are 
reported,
Manipulation Check
Members of the two check groups responded to source 
credibility evaluations of Paul Sharp and Curtis Harris as 
well as evaluated each of the clearly stated and equivocated 
disagree issues. Results confirmed the assumption that on 
the topic of what should be included in a liberal college 
education, Paul Sharp was perceived as being a high credible 
source and Curtis Harris was perceived as being a low cred­
ible source (See Appendix J).
Results also indicated that: (1) the statements
contending that social sciences courses, ethnic studies 
courses, and mathematics courses should be included in a 
liberal college education were moderately to highly agree­
able, (2) "A" to "F" grading, required courses, and foreign 
language courses were viewed as being disagreeable, (3) the
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equivocated statements referring to "A" to "P" grading, 
required courses, and foreign language courses were more 
acceptable to the subjects than the clearly stated disagree 
issues, and (4) the equivocated disagree issues were not 
perceived as being significantly more vague than the clearly 
stated disagree issues (See Appendix J). In sum, these 
findings reveal that the operationalizations for source 
credibility and message vagueness were successful.
Hypothesized Findings
The results regarding agreement with the message are 
presented in Table 1 and Table 2, The analysis of variance 
reveals that there was not a significant interaction between 
message vagueness and source credibility (F= 1.600, p<,205); 
therefore. Hypothesis 1 must be rejected. In like manner, a 
significant interaction was not found between message vague­
ness, source credibility, and time (F= 0.101, p<.903)} thus. 
Hypothesis 2 must also be rejected.
Regarding the number of disagree issues recalled. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted a significant interaction between 
message vagueness and time, while Hypothesis 5 predicted a 
significant interaction between message vagueness, order of 
agree-disagree issues, and time. A review of Table 3 and 
Table 4 indicates that the results do not support these hypoth­
eses (F= 0 .4 3 8, p < . 516 , and F= 2.9 65, p < .084, respectively); 
therefore. Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 must be rejected.
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The final dependent variable to be analyzed was the 
quality of recall of disagree issues. So as to insure an 
objective measure of the quality of recall, three judges 
independently scored each of the clearly stated disagree 
issues. Inter-judge reliability ranged from ,879 to .974  
(See Appendix K). Each subject's score for the quality of 
recall of disagree issues was the most common score produced 
from the evaluation of the three judges. The mean scores 
and analysis of variance are presented in Table 5 and Table 6. 
These findings indicate that there was not a significant 
interaction between message vagueness and time (F= 1 . 215» 
p< . 2 7 2 ) ,  and that message vagueness, order of agree-disagree 
issues, and time did not produce a significant interaction 
(F= 1 .675 ,  p < . 196) ;  therefore. Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 6 
must be rejected.
Unhypothesized Findings
While the results confirmed none of the hypothesized 
findings, there were several significant findings produced 
from this study. In terms of agreement there was a signif­
icant main effect for source credibility (F= 4 , 983» p < . 009) ,  
with a mean of 21,750 for the high credible source, 17,055  
for the low credible source, and 20,819 for the unidentified 
source. Tukey's HSD test revealed significant differences 
between the high credible source and low credible source 
(HSD= 4 .2 1 6 ,  p < .05)  and between the unidentified source and 
low credible source (HSD= 3 *380 , p < . 05) .  In addition it
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was found that the message containing clearly stated dis­
agree issues was significantly more disagreeable than the 
message containing equivocated issues (F= 14.732, p<.0005)« 
Table 4 reveals that with regard to the number of 
disagree issues recalled there was a main effect due to 
time. Significantly more disagree issues were recalled at 
time one than at time two (F= 16,859f P< .0002).
Two significant findings are observed in Table 6 
where the results concerning the quality of disagree issues 
recalled are presented. The quality of recall of clearly 
stated disagree issues was significantly greater than the 
quality of recall of equivocated disagree issues (F= 8.974, 
p< .004), and the quality of recall of disagree issues at 
time one was significantly greater than at time two (F= 
120.483, p< .0001).
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TABLE 1 
MEAN SCORES FOR AGREEMENT
Time 1 Time 2
Clearly Agree- 
Clearly Clearly Disagree 
Stated Order
16.222 15.888
Disagree Clearly Disagree- 
. Message Clearly Agree 
? n-.rnr Order
19.444 19.666
29.555 27.333
Order
23.555 22.333
Clearly Agree- 
C1early Clearly Disagree 
Stated Order
15.444 18.444
Disagree Clearly Disagree- 
- ^ Message Clearly Agree 
r? ri 11^ ,1 r order
14.444 15.333
stuMe Clearly Agree- 
E,«iv
18.222 18.666
«eSs^e
Order
17.000 18.388
Clearly Agree- 
C1early Clearly Disagree 
Stated Order
18.000 18.222
Disagree Clearly Disagree- 
Message Clearly Agree 
Unidentified Order
17.444 20.333
Source Clearly Agree-
21.888 23.666
Messlge
Order
23.666 23.333
Main Effect Mean
High Credible Source 21.750
Low Credible Source 17.055
Unidentified Source 20.819
Clearly Stated Disagree Message 17.407
Equivocated Disagree Message 22.342
Agree-Disagree Order 20.129
Disagree-Agree Order 19.620
Time One 19.574
Time Two 20.175
52
TABLE 2
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR AGREEMENT
SOURCE SS DF MS F P
Between Subjects 11494.190 107
A (Credibility) 889.750 2 444.875 4 ,983 0.009*
B (Vagueness) 1315.250 1 1315.250 14.732 0.0005*
C (Order) 14.063 1 14.063 0 ,157 0 .695
AB 265.688 2 142.844 1 ,600 0 .205
AC 43 .376 2 21.688 0.243 0.788
BC 84.313 1 84.313 0 ,9 4 4 0 .665
ABC 291.062 2 145.531 1 ,630 0.200
Error (Between) 8570.688 96 89.278
Within Subjects 1209.462 108
T (Time) 19.563 1 19.563 1.761 0,184
TA 61,500 2 30.750 2 .768 0.066
TB 16.125 1 16.125 1 .452 0.229
TC 0.750 1 0.750 0 ,067 0.791
TAB 2.250 2 1.125 0,101 0.903
TAC 2 .876 2 1.438 0 .129 0.879
TBC 0 .250 1 0.250 0.022 0 .876
TABC 39.876 2 19.938 1.795 0.180
Error (Within) 1066.272 96 11.107
Total 12703.652 215
♦Significant p<0.01 
♦♦Significant p <  0,0005
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TABLE 3
MEAN SCORES FOR THE NUMBER OP 
DISAGREE ISSUES RECALLED
Time 1 Time 2
Clearly Agree- 
Clearly Clearly Disagree 
Stated Order
2 . 2 2 2 2 . 0 0 0
Disagree Clearly Disagree- 
... . Message Clearly Agree 
S S i M r  order
2 . 3 3 3 1 . 7 7 7
S m r e e  Clearly Agree-
& C C
1 . 5 5 5 1 . 3 3 3
«essfge
Order
2 . 2 2 2 1 . 7 7 7
Clearly Agree- 
Clearly Clearly Disagree 
Stated Order
1 . 7 7 7 1 . 6 6 6
Disagree Clearly Disagree- 
Message Clearly Agree
r v * » M r  order
2 . 3 3 3 1 . 8 8 8
S o u r c e  Clearly Agree-
1 . 7 7 7 1 . 4 4 4
«eSafge
Order
1 . 7 7 7 1 . 7 7 7
Clearly Agree- 
C1early Clearly Disagree 
Stated Order
2 . 2 2 2 2 . 0 0 0
Disagree Clearly Disagree- 
Message Clearly Agree 
Unidentified Order
2 . 3 3 3 1 . 8 8 8
Source Clearly Agree- 
& c e
2 . 0 0 0 1 . 5 5 5
«.essfge K l y % l : " -
Order
2 . 0 0 0 2 . 0 0 0
Main Effect Mean
High Credible Source 1.902
Low Credible Source 1 . 8 0 5
Unidentified Source 2.000
Clearly Stated Disagree Message 2 . 0 3 7
Equivocated Disagree Message 1.768
Agree-Disagree Order 1 .796
Disagree-Agree Order 2.009
Time One 2 . 0 4 6
Time Two 1 . 7 5 9
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TABLE 4
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE NUMBER OF
DISAGREE ISSUES RECALLED
SOURCE SS DF MS F P
Between Subjects 121.418 107
A (Credibility) 1 .362 2 0.681 0.588 0.563
B (Vagueness) 3.893 1 3.893 3.364 0.066
C (Order) 2.449 1 2.449 2.116 0.145
AB 0 .232 2 0.116 0.100 0.904
AC 0.286 2 0.143 0.124 0.883
BC 0.560 1 0.560 0.484 0.505
ABC 1 .564 2 0.782 0.676 0 .516
Error (Between) 111.072 96 1.157
Within Subjects 31.509 108
T (Time) 4 .449 1 4.449 16.859 0.0002^
TA 0 .176 2 0.088 0.333 0.722
TB 0 .116 1 0.116 0.438 0.516
TC 0.042 1 0.042 0.158 0.694
TAB 0.008 2 0.004 0.017 0.984
TAC 0 .360 2 0.180 0.684 0.512
TBC 0 .782 1 0.782 2.965 0.084
TABC 0 .232 2 0 .116 0.439 0.654
Error (Within) 25 .344 96 0.264
Total 152.927 215
♦Significant p< 0.001
55
TABLE 5
MEAN SCORES FOR THE QUALITY OP 
DISAGREE ISSUES RECALLED
Time 1 Time 2
Clearly
Stated
Clearly Agree- 
Clearly Disagree 
Order
6.333 3.888
High
Disagree
Message
Clearly Disagree- 
Clearly Agree 
Order
6.000 3.555
0P6U.X Dxe 
Source
Equiv.
Disagree
Message
Clearly Agree- 
Equiv. Disagree 
Order
4 . 0 0 0 2.111
Equiv. Disagree- 
Clearly Agree 
Order
4.888 2.888
Clearly
Stated
Clearly Agree- 
Clearly Disagree 
Order
5.555 3.666
Low
Disagree
Message
Clearly Disagree- 
Clearly Agree 
Order
6.000 3.555
oPeCu. uXB
Source
Equiv.
Disagree
Message
Clearly Agree- 
Equiv. Disagree 
Order
4.111 2.111
Equiv. Disagree- 
Clearly Agree 
Order
4.555 3.111
Clearly
Stated
Clearly Agree- 
Clearly Disagree 
Order
5.555 4 . 0 0 0
Unidentified
Disagree
Message
clearly Disagree- 
Clearly Agree 
Order
6.777 3.555
Source
Equiv.
Disagree
Message
clearly Agree- 
Equiv. Disagree 
Order
4.555 2.333
Equiv. Disagree- 
Clearly Agree 
Order
4.888 3.000
Main Effect Mean
High Credible Source 4.208
Low Credible Source 4.083
Unidentified Source 4.333
Clearly Stated Disagree Message 4.870
Equivocated Disagree Message 3.546
Agree-Disagree Order 4.018
Disagree-Agree Order 4.398
Time One 5.268
Time Two 3.148
56
TABLE 6
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE QUALITY OF
DISAGREE ISSUES RECALLED
SOURCE SS DF MS F P
Between Subjects 1126.14? 107
A (Credibility) 2.250 2 1 .125 0.107 0.899
B (Vagueness) 94.671 1 94.671 8 ,974 0.004*
C (Order) 7.782 1 7 .782 0.738 0.603
AB 0.620 2 0 .310 0.030 0.972
AC 0 .454 2 0 .227 0.021 0.979
BC 5.042 1 5.042 0.478 0.502
ABC 2,528 2 1.264 0.120 0.887
Error (Between) 1012.800 96 10.550
Within Subjects 447.494 108
T (Time) 242.782 1 242.782 120.483 0 .0001*
TA 0.842 2 0.421 0.209 0.814
TB 2.449 1 2.449 1 .215 0.272
TC 0 .782 1 0 .782 0.388 0.542
TAB 0 .062 2 0.031 0.015 0.986
TAC 1.232 2 0.616 0.306 0.742
TBC 3.375 1 3 .375 1.675 0.196
TABC 2.530 2 1 .265 0.628 0.540
Error (Within) 193.440 96 2 .015
Total 1573.641 215
*Signifleant p < 0.01 
•“•♦Significant p <  0.0001
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
Interpretations of the results are offered in this 
chapter. Agreement with clearly stated or equivocated 
disagree messages is discussed first, followed by an 
analysis of the findings concerning recall and the rela­
tionship between agreement and recall. The section 
dealing with agreement and the section dealing with re­
call are subdivided into three main areas of discussion. 
First, each dependent variable is considered in terms of 
the hypothesized results. Second, observed significant 
findings other than hypothesized results are discussed. 
Finally, a variety of speculative interpretations are 
offered. This speculation is based on statistically 
nonsignificant results euid deals primarily with poten­
tial interaction effects. Since this study was initially 
designed as an exploratory effort, one of its main functions 
was to discuss trends between the various independent and 
dependent variables selected for studyi therefore, this 
last consideration is very important. Here only the most 
relevant systematic tendencies suggested by the data are
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explored. The chapter concludes by providing some direc­
tions for future research and a summary of the entire study.
Agreement
Two of the hypotheses tested in this study were 
concerned with agreement:
Hi: There will be a significant interaction between
the degree of message vagueness and source 
credibility when message agreement is measured.
H2: There will be a significant interaction between
the degree of message vagueness, source credibil­
ity, and time when message agreement is measured.
While there was some indication of a message by source
interaction (P= I.6 0 0, p< .205)* there was virtually no
evidence to support the message by source by time interaction
(F= 0.101» p < .903). In a design as complex as the one used
in this study the best explanation for these nonsignificant
hypotheses, assuming that the experimental procedure and
operationalizations were sound, seems to be that there are
other factors which may be operating. In the following
paragraphs we will look beyond the hypothesized findings in
an effort to discover these other factors.
In Chapter I the persuasion literature was reconcep­
tualized in terms of the nature of the message and how the 
receiver processes information. Three types of messages 
were considered: (1) a clearly stated message which is
moderately to highly discrepant with the receiver's existing 
concepts, (2) a clearly stated message which is neutral or 
slightly discrepant with the receiver's existing concepts,
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and (3) a vague message which does not clearly identify with 
the receiver’s concepts. Each of these types of messages 
tends to produce different kinds of agreement responses. In 
keeping with this persuasion literature, many of the results 
in this study, even though unhypothesized, support the 
findings of previous research.
The message containing clearly stated disagree issues 
attributed to an unidentified source produced only neutral 
agreement (X= 20.819), while the high credible source generated 
slightly more agreement (X= 21,750), and the low credible 
source tended to reduce agreement with the message (X= 17*055)* 
The significant main effect for source credibility (F= 4.983, 
p <,009) is not surprising and confirms prior research which 
says a high credible source is more persuasive than a low 
credible source. It would appear that high source credibility 
tends to facilitate the assimilation process while low 
source credibility encourages disagreement and even contrast 
effects.
In addition to the finding that credibility effects 
agreement, there was a significant main effect for message 
vagueness (P= 14,732, p<,0005) which suggests that clearly 
stated disagree issues are rejected by the person hearing 
the message. This rejection effect is observed regardless 
of the credibility of the source. With equivocated disagree 
issues, however, the receiver is more favorably disposed 
toward the message. It seems that the equivocated message
6o
is more acceptable since it allows more flexibility in 
interpreting the speaker's meaning, even though the speaker's 
true feelings might not be completely understood by the 
receiver. It would appear that while the equivocated message 
falls within the receiver's latitude of noncommitment or 
latitude of acceptance, clearly stated disagree issues prob­
ably fall in his latitude of rejection. One message is 
tolerated or even accepted while the other is disruptive and 
rejected. In terms of agreement, then, these findings suggest 
that the speaker would be well advised to equivocate disagree 
issues instead of clearly stmA# them, v
In light of the significant findings for message 
vagueness and since neither of the interaction hypotheses 
for agreement were significant, we must conclude that in 
terms of the significance level chosen for this study, the 
main effects for source credibility and message vagueness 
are the most meaningful claims we can make about equivocation. 
There is some indication, however, that even though these 
main effects are meaningful, certain nonsignificant inter­
actions might also be worth consideration. For example, 
there is a strong tendency toward a source by time inter­
action (P= 2.768, p < , 066), A sleeper effect seems to be 
operating since the mean scores for the low credibility 
condition are 16.277 at time one and 17.833 at time two, 
while the means for the high credibility condition are 
22.194 at time one and 21.305 at time two. These findings
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tend to indicate that the message of a low credible source 
is more agreeable at time two than at time one while agree­
ment with the message of a high credible source diminishes 
over time.
In addition to the nonsignificant source by time 
interaction and the source by message interaction tested by 
Hypothesis 1, there are other interaction; tendencies between 
source credibility, message vagueness, and order of agree- 
disagree issues (F= 1.630, p < .200) and between source 
credibility, message vagueness, order of agree-disagree 
issues, and time (F= 1.795# p<.18Q). Some interesting 
theoretical implications emerge from a more detailed analy­
sis of these nonsignificant interactions, and the discussion 
which follows considers the possibility of an interaction 
between all four of the independent variables investigated 
in this study. It should be realized that this discussion 
is primarily speculative, depending solely on the observa­
tion of mean scores generated from a nonsignificant inter­
action; however, such an endeavor might possibly lead to a 
more insightful understanding of equivocation.
The interpretation of an interaction is often 
difficult, and as the number of variables increases the 
task becomes more complex. Illustration 2 was designed to 
clarify the nature of a potentially significant interaction 
between source credibility, message vagueness, order of 
agree-disagree issues, and time. Consider first the conse-
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ILLUSTRATION 2
ILLUSTRATION OF INTERACTION BETWEEN 
SOURCE CREDIBILITY, MESSAGE VAGUENESS, 
ORDER OF AGREE-DISAGREE ISSUES, AND 
TIME WITH AGREEMENT AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Clearly Stated 
Disagree Issues
Equivocated 
Disagree Issues
30.
29*
28.
27*
26.
25*
24.
c 23- 
<u 
§ 22.
* 21.
W)
<  20.
19-
18-
17'
16
15'
14
Time 1
High Gred., A-D 
High Gred,, D-A 
No Gred., A-D 
No Gred., D-A 
Low Gred., A-D 
Low Cred., D-A
Time 2
304
29 
28- 
27-
26- 
25- 
24- 
c23H 
§22^
<<204
19
18-
17-
16-
15-
14-
Time 1
High Cred., A-D 
High Cred., D-A 
No Cred., A-D 
No Cred., D-A 
Low Cred., A-D 
Low Cred., D-A
Time 2
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quences of addressing disagree issues clearly. The graph 
reveals that regardless of source credibility, the order of 
agree-disagree issues, and time, very little agreement is 
achieved, (A mean score of "20" on the agreement scale was 
the neutral score.) It also indicates that even though 
agreement is minimal, a low credible source should use an 
agree-disagree order since this produces more agreement at 
time one and even more at time two. In other words, there 
is a tendency for a sleeper effect to occur; however, when 
a low credible source uses a disagree-agree order there is 
very little change at time two, and the sleeper effect is 
seemingly disrupted. In contrast, the most desirable out­
come is different for an unidentified source clearly stating 
disagree issues. Here the agree-disagree order does not 
appear to effect agreement at time one, but the disagree- 
agree order produces more agreement at time two, A similar 
pattern occurs for a high credible source. At both time one 
and time two the disagree-agree order is more effective than 
the agree-disagree order. These results suggest that if 
disagree issues are clearly stated there is a tendency for a 
recency effect for a high credible source and an unidentified 
source but a primacy effect for a low credible source. It 
would appear that the information processor initially accepts 
a high credible source, possibly paying less attention to 
the issues presented first, with the latter comments making 
a more lasting impression, A low credible source, however.
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does not have the immediate approval of the audience and by 
addressing disagree issues first only confirms anticipated 
differences. Such an initial impression can dominate the 
receiver's processing of the entire message and may even 
effect future agreement. By addressing agree issues first, 
however, there is less of a tendency for strong disagreement 
and the chances of a sleeper effect are increased.
Illustration 2 also presents the mean shifts for the 
message where disagree issues were equivocated. It reveals 
that a source, despite his credibility, always does better 
when disagree issues are equivocated. The very best circum­
stance is a high credible source using an agree-disagree 
order (X=; 29*555)• Strong agreement is attained at time 
one as well as at time two, A similar pattern occurs for 
the low credible source, where agree-disagree order is more 
effective at time one but at time two there appears to be 
little difference due to order. In contrast, the unidenti­
fied source produces more agreement at time one with the 
disagree-agree order than with the agree-disagree order, 
with minimal differences between the two orders at time two. 
These mean patterns suggest that when disagree issues are 
equivocated there is a tendency for a primacy effect for 
both a high credible source and a low credible source but a 
recency effect for an unidentified source. It would appear 
that by addressing agreeable issues first a favorable context 
is created for accepting the equivocated disagree issues.
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These results differ from those where disagree issues are 
clearly stated. Perhaps the best explanation for these 
differences is that the receiver processes disagreeable 
information and agreeable information in different ways.
In the situation where disagreeable issues are clearly stated, 
and depending on the credibility of the source as well as the 
arrangement of the issues, it might be that a particular 
processing pattern is cued. Under different circumstances 
where disagree issues are equivocated, another system might 
be set into action. As mentioned earlier, these speculations 
are highly tenuous, and the results produced from the four 
way interaction may be occurring merely by chance; however, 
they raise interesting possibilities concerning human infor­
mation processing and agreement with different kinds of 
messages which should be explored in more detail.
Recall
In addition to agreement, the number of disagree 
issues recalled and the quality of disagree issues recalled 
were of interest to this study. Four hypotheses concerned 
with these two types of recall were tested:
H3i There will be a significant interaction between
the degree of message vagueness and time when
amount of recall is measured.
H4i There will be a significant interaction between
the degree of message vagueness and time when
quality of recall is measured.
H5i There will be a significant interaction between
the degree of message vagueness, message order,
and time when amount of recall is measured.
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h 6i There will be a significant interaction between 
the degree of message vagueness, message order, 
and time when quality of recall is measured.
Hypothesis 3 (P= 0.438, p <  .516) and Hypothesis 4 (F= 1.215, 
p <  .272) dealt with the interaction between message vagueness 
and time. While Hypothesis 4 might possibly be indicating a 
potentially significant interaction effect, Hypothesis 3 does 
not even approach statistical significance. In contrast, 
the message by order by time interactions posed in Hypothesis 
5 (F= 2.9 6 5, p < .084) and Hypothesis 6 (F= 1.6?5, P <  .196) 
showed more of a tendency toward significance for both the 
number and quality of disagree issues recalled, with this 
combination of variables appearing to be the most meaningful 
interaction in each of the recall measures. Before consider­
ing these nonsignificant interactions in more detail, however, 
there are several main effects which should be considered 
first.
As a rule, the significant results produced from the 
two recall measures parallel each other very closely. For 
both the number and quality of disagree issues recalled 
there was a highly significant main effect for time (F= 16.859, 
p<.0002, and P= 120.483, p< .0001, respectively). Both 
findings support previous research. Over time information 
tends to be forgotten, not necessarily because of the passing 
of time but primarily due to the interference of new material. 
In addition, the quality of recall measure indicated a signif­
icant main effect due to message vagueness (F= 8.9?8, p<.004).
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The mean scores suggest that clearly stated disagree issues 
are recalled better them equivocated disagree issues. This 
finding supports the notion that equivocated disagree issues 
do not provide as meaningful a cue for recall as do clearly 
stated disagree issues; thus, there is a tendency for equivo­
cated issues to be forgotten more quickly or distorted by 
the information processor.
There are several other results with regard to recall 
which should be considered even though they were not signif­
icant. For the number of disagree issues recalled there was 
a strong tendency for a message vagueness main effect (F= 
3 .36^, p<,066). This result parallels the significant 
quality of recall finding for message vagueness and suggests 
that more clearly stated disagree issues are recalled than 
equivocated disagree issues. In addition, there was a 
nonsignificant main effect which implies that more disagree 
issues may be recalled if they are presented first rather 
than if they are presented after agree issues (F= 2,116, 
p <  ,145)1 however, there was no indication that the order of 
agree-disagree issues had any effect on the quality of dis­
agree issues recalled (F= 0,738, p<.603). Finally, a 
nonsignificant main effect was found for source credibility 
both for the number of issues recalled (F= O.5 8 8, p < . 563) 
and the quality of recall (F= 0,107» p <  .899). These last 
two results are not surprising, however, since they concur 
with prior research which indicates that the source of a
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message generally has little to no effect on recall.
In addition to these nonsignificant main effects 
there were several interaction effects which were not 
significant but which suggest some interesting tendencies.
As mentioned previously in the discussion of Hypothesis 5 
where the number of disagree issues was the dependent 
variable, there was an indication of a potential inter­
action between message vagueness, order of agree-disagree 
issues, and time (F= 2 .965, p<.084). Disagree issues 
were more readily recalled if they were presented first, 
and this trend was observed for both the clearly stated 
and equivocated conditions, A further analysis of the 
means also reveals that the poorest recall occurred when 
disagree issues were equivocated, an agree-disagree order 
was used, and measurement was at time two (X= 1,444). In
contrast, the best recall occurred in the clearly stated
condition at time one where the disagree-agree order was 
used (X= 2,333)* The message by order by time interaction 
with the quality of recall of disagree issues as the depen­
dent variable also proved to be nonsignificant (F= 1,675, 
P < , 1 9 6 ) i  however, it too showed the same trend as the
number of disagree issues recalled. The poorest quality
of recall occurred in the equivocated message, agree-disagree 
order, time two condition (X= 2,185), and the best quality 
of recall occurred in the clearly stated message, disagree- 
agree order, time one condition (X= 6,259),
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These nonsignificant tendencies suggest that the 
recall of disagree issues might be dependent on something 
more than message vagueness. Perhaps the order of agree- 
disagree issues as well as time must also be considered if 
we are to fully understand the recall of disagree issues.
It would appear that a clearly stated message where disagree 
issues are presented first provides an easier tag for imme­
diate recall than an equivocated message which is vague and 
imprecise. Since equivocated messages do not tend to facilitate 
recall,the speaker might not have to be as concerned about 
creating long-term memory cues in the receiver which could 
retard future persuasion. Overall it would seem that in 
terms of the number and quality of disagree issues recalled, 
equivocating the disagreeable information and presenting it 
in the latter part of the message should inhibit subsequent 
recall,
Relationship Between Agreement and Recall
A review of the analysis of variance tables and mean 
scores for the agreement and recall measures tends to indicate 
that each of these dependent variables are influenced by 
message vagueness. With agreement the equivocation of dis­
agree issues produced significantly more overall agreement, 
and with recall significantly more forgetting occurred when 
the disagree issues were equivocated. Agreement and recall, 
however, were not equally effected by all of the independent 
variables investigated in this study. Source credibility
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had much more of an influence on agreement than it had on 
recall. This finding is not surprising since prior research 
demonstrates that recall is rarely improved or weakened 
due to the credibility of the source. In contrast, the time 
variable seemed to have a greater effect on recall than on 
agreement. More specifically, the quality of recall seemed 
to vary more over time than did agreement.
These findings lead us to a provocative yet crucial 
question with regard to equivocation: Over time, is.agree­
ment with the message dependent on the recall of the con­
tents which produced it? That is, is the decay of an atti­
tude a function of the decay of the information which created 
it, or is it a separate and independent process? Watts and 
McGuire (1964) have produced evidence to indicate that as 
time passes, induced opinion change and recall become more 
autonomous. The present study tends to indicate a similar 
phenomenon. There was very little change over the two week 
interval for agreement, but there was a significant decline 
between time one and time two for the quality of recall.
This might be an indication that the attitudes we hold are 
not simply a function of the information producing them. 
Perhaps we use attitudes as a higher level organization 
mechanism which allows us to process and categorize large 
amounts of information but retain only a portion of the 
original input. Organization theorists in their study of 
word list recall have indicated that man follows a pattern
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of coding, recoding, and assimilating in an effort to under­
stand and cope with his environment, and it appears that we 
use our attitudes to carry out a similar function. Instead 
of trying to retain and understand the details of a message 
from a very logical perspective, our attitudes allow us 
immediate evaluation. Our experiences are tagged as "right- 
wrong," "good-bad," or "liked-disliked," and the message is 
processed just enough to determine how we feel about the 
topic under consideration. As a result, our cue for recall 
is the attitude we have created instead of the message con­
tent. Unlike the laborious task of generating an organiza­
tional hierarchy for recalling the message itself, attitude 
recall is much more parsimonious and effort saving.
This speculation has some important implications for 
the rhetorical use of equivocation. It would indicate that 
in terms of eliciting a favorable response from the audience, 
a speaker should not become so preoccupied with explicitly 
disclosing his position that he overlooks the disposition it 
might create in the receiver. If the speaker knows that 
certain issues are disagreeable and if he feels that the 
circumstances seriously limit the probability of successful 
persuasion, then equivocation appears to be the best alter­
native available. It provides the speaker with an effective 
means for avoiding premature exposure of his innermost feel­
ings, it leaves the receiver with a neutral to moderately 
favorable disposition, it minimizes the chances of recalling
72
the disagreeable issues, and it avoids negative connotations 
which might jeopardize future persuasive attempts.
Directions for Future Research 
While the results of this study have provided more 
insight into the nature of equivocation, an exploratory effort 
such as this one leaves us with far more questions than an­
swers. Perhaps the most pressing need at the moment is a 
series of replications employing certain experimental varia­
tions in an effort to verify or modify the findings of this 
study. If a more complex message containing twice as many 
agreeable and disagreeable issues was used, the interaction 
effects originally anticipated or tending to approach signif­
icance might indeed prove to be significant. The messages- 
used in the present study did not seriously challenge the 
memory capacity of the subjects, but a detailed and longer 
message might tax their memory more.
The order in which agree-disagree issues are presented 
also needs reconsideration. While there was a tendency for 
the agree-disagree order to be more agreeable and to reduce 
the number etnd quality of equivocated issues recalled, perhaps 
a more complex arrangement such as agree-disagree-agree 
or alternating agree and disagree issues would produce a 
more desirable effect. It might be far too simplistic to 
think in terms of an agree-disagree or disagree-agree order.
The time variable also needs to be investigated in 
more detail. This study limited itself to a two week interval;
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however, it would be interesting to find out how agreement 
and recall vary over a four, six, or even eight week time 
period. The results would help clarify the issue of whether 
agreement is autonomous of recall or whether there initially 
is a relationship between agreement and recall which dissolves 
over time. The agreement-recall relationship might be the 
most enlightening and profitable direction of research for 
those interested in equivocation. If we better understood 
how the recall of message content effects attitudes over time 
or how the recall of prior attitudes effects present attitudes 
it would provide valuable and useful information in terms of 
assessing the effectiveness of equivocation.
While this study was concerned more with investigating 
the effects of equivocation than the philosophical nature of 
the concept, more research needs to be done to clarify more 
completely exactly what makes a word or phrase vague.
Hiller’s (1968) dictionary of vague expressions is a good 
beginning, but the operationalization of vagueness still 
needs more clarification. In a similar vein, it would be 
profitable to find out why the receiver of an equivocated 
message does or does not perceive it to be vague or why 
some persons respond favorably to equivocation while others 
resist it. Certain personality types, such as a high 
Machiavellian, might be more perceptive to the manipulation 
of equivocated messages and persuasive techniques. The 
study of equivocation in relation to personality traits
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might possibly produce a completely new dimension of under­
standing about the effects of equivocation.
Unanswered questions regarding the processing of 
agreeable and disagreeable messages is another area of 
research which needs additional consideration, and more 
needs to be known about the cues the information processor 
stores for subsequent recall. This study offers some 
evidence to indicate that equivocated disagree messages 
are more difficult to recall than clearly stated disagree 
messages, but additional dependent variables such as the 
degree of distortion and number of different themes generated 
from clearly stated and equivocated statements would also 
be helpful in better understanding the effects of equivo­
cation, In addition, the recall of oral versus written 
equivocated messages might also produce interesting differ­
ences.
Equivocation research is a relatively new area of 
interest I therefore, research possibilities are numerous.
With additional experimentation and study, however, we 
should approach a level of understanding which will allow 
us to better explain m  iwell as predict the antecedent and 
consequent effects of equivocation. Such findings should 
make a meaningful contribution to social science research 
and the body of knowledge coneezmed with understanding 
human communication behavior.
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Summary
This exploratory study investigated the effects of 
deliberate vagueness, order of agree-disagree issues, source 
credibility, and time on receiver agreement and recalls 
One hundred and eight (108) undergraduate subjects were 
randomly assigned to conditions in a four factor mixed design 
with one repeated factor. Deliberate vagueness was defined 
as a message which clearly addressed disagree issues or 
equivocated disagree issues. Order of agree-disagree issues 
was defined as the presentation of three agree issues in 
the first part of the message followed by three disagree 
issues, or vice versa. Source credibility was defined as 
high, low, or unidentified. The time variable was defined 
as measurement immediately after exposure to the message 
and two weeks later.
The results indicated that with regard to agreement
there was a significant main effect due to credibility (with
the high credible source evoking more agreement) and message
vagueness (with the equivocated disagree message producing
more agreement). A strong tendency toward a time by source
interaction was also detected, indicating a potential
"sleeper effect." For the number and quality of disagree 
%
issues recalled there was a significant main effect for 
time (with more recall at time one), and a significant main 
effect for message vagueness was also found for the quality 
of disagree issues recalled (where clearly stated disagree
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issues were recalled better than equivocated disagree issues). 
In addition there were indications, even though they were not 
significant, of a message by order by source by time inter­
action for agreement (with the equivocated disagree message, 
agree-disagree order, high credible source, time one condi­
tion producing the greatest agreement and the clearly stated 
disagree message, disagree-agree order, low credible source, 
time one condition producing the least agreement), and a 
message by order by time interaction for both the number and 
quality of disagree issues recalled (with the clearly stated 
disagree message, disagree-agree order, time one condition 
producing the best recall and the equivocated disagree message, 
agree-disagree order, time two condition producing the poorest 
recall).
It was concluded that since equivocated disagree issues 
are more agreeable than clearly stated disagree issues and 
since they do not provide as strong a cue for recall, the 
speaker who knows his audience disagrees with him on certain 
issues would be well advised to use deliberate vagueness.
The audience maintains a neutral to moderately favorable 
disposition, and when the equivocated topic is addressed at 
a later date the speaker does not have to be as concerned 
about the recall of disagreeable issues. Furthermore, it 
was concluded that this rhetorical technique should be viewed 
more as a stalling strategy rather than an attitude change 
strategy. In contrast to the tenet advocated since antiquity
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that all issues should always be addressed clearly, this 
study indicates that under certain circumstances the speaker 
should use deliberate vagueness.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A 
CLEARLY STATED AND EQUIVOCATED ISSUES
Clearly Stated Agree Issues
1. Students need to take social sciences courses such as 
psychology and sociology. Not only do these types of courses 
teach us interesting things about ourselves but also they 
prepare us for involvement in an increasingly complex society. 
The understanding of who we are and how we function is a 
prerequisite for coping with and accepting the society we
are a part of.
2. If a student is to acquire a truly liberal college educa­
tion he should be exposed to ethnic studies courses. Black, 
Chicano, and Indian sub-cultures are an important part of 
American life, and the study of these ethnic groups should 
prove enlightening for any student.
3. Studies in mathematics have always played an important 
role in the curriculum of a university, and students should 
take at least the beginning courses in algebra or trigonome­
try during their undergraduate program. The fundamental 
concepts taught in these courses are principles which may 
be generalized and applied to many facets of the student's 
life.
Clearly Stated Disagree Issues
1. All students should be required to take foreign language 
courses such as French, Spanish, or German. In our world 
today there is much more international communication than 
ever before, and it is important that we offer courses in 
our universities which provide in-depth information about 
other nations.
2. With no exceptions, students should always be graded on 
an "A" to "P" grading scale. Student evaluation is an 
important part of the academic community. It serves many 
useful functions, the most noticeable being that it provides 
a means of assessment which enables the student as well as 
the administration to gauge successful learning.
3. It is absolutely necessary that all students follow a 
strict schedule of required courses dictated by the adminis­
tration. A meaningful and useful college education is more 
than taking courses at random, and students will get the 
very most out of their college education if they follow
the advisement of experienced educators.
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Equivocated Disagree Issues
1. On the whole, students should take courses which 
concentrate on the communication behavior of other countries. 
In our world today there is much more international communi­
cation than ever before, and it is important that we offer 
courses in our universities which provide in-depth informa­
tion about other nations,
2. Generally speaking, students should be evaluated by some 
systematic grading scale. Student evaluation is an important 
part of the academic community. It serves many useful func­
tions, the most noticeable being that it provides a means of 
assessment which enables the student as well as the adminis­
tration to gauge successful learning,
3. Students as a rule should be encouraged to follow a degree 
program which has been designed by professional educators,
A meaningful and useful college education is more than taking 
courses at random, and students will get the very most out of 
their college education if they follow the advisement of 
experienced educators.
APPENDIX B
QUALITY OF RECALL OF DISAGREE ISSUES
Scoring Procedure for Clearly Stated Disagree Issues
The quality of recall score for each of the clearly 
stated disagree statements was dependent on the subject's 
ability to recall the issue and the rationale supporting 
that statement in as much detail as was presented in the 
original message. Each statement was divided into four 
distinguishing pieces of information.
1. Foreign Language Courses
(Issue) (1) Foreign language courses, like French,
Spanish, or German (at least one example 
given).
(2) All students should be required to take 
a foreign language.
(3) There is more international communica­
tion in the world today.
(4) Universities should offer courses that 
provide in-depth information about 
other nations.
2. "A" to "F" Grading
(Issue) (1) "A" to "F" grading scale should be used.
(2) With no exceptions, students should 
always be graded on this basis.
(Rationale) (3) Student evaluation is an important part
of the academic community.
(4) This is a means of assessment for the 
student as well as the administration 
(at least one is given).
3. Required Courses
(Rationale)
(Issue)
(Rationale)
(1) Follow a strict schedule of required 
courses.
(2) It is absolute necessary that the admin­
istration dictate this schedule of 
courses.
A college education is more than taking 
courses at random.
Must follow the advice of experienced 
educators %o get the most from a college 
education.
(3)
(4)
The recall of each statement was determined to be 
either sketchy, good, or very good. A sketchy recall was 
one where only part of one of the two elements within the 
issue or rationale category was recalled. A good recall was 
one where one of the two elements within the issue or rationale 
category was recalled. A very good recall was where both of 
the two elements within the issue or rationale category was 
recalled.
90
91
After determining if the quality of recall for the 
issue and rationale was sketchy, good, or very good, one of 
the following ratings was given to each disagree statementi
0 —  Neither the issue nor the rationale was recalled.
1 —  A sketchy recall of either the issue or rationale
but not both.
2 —  A good recall of either the issue or the rationale
but not both, or a good recall of the issue or the 
rationale but only a sketchy recall of the other 
category.
3 —  A good recall of the issue and a good recall of the
rationale.
4 —  A very good recall of the issue or the rationale but
a good recall of the other category.
5 —  A very good recall of the issue and a very good recall
of the rationale.
Scoring Procedure for Equivocated Disagree Issues
The quality of recall for each of the equivocated 
disagree statements was determined by employing a method 
similar to that used for getting the quality of recall for 
the clearly stated disagree Statements. As before, each 
statement was divided into four distinguishing pieces of 
information, with the two pieces of information for the 
rationale remaining the same for the clearly stated and 
equivocated disagree statements. Recall of the issue, 
however, was different:
1. Foreign Language Courses
(Issue) (1) Take courses concentrating on the
communication behavior in other 
countries•
(2) On the whole, students should take 
these courses.
2. "A- to "P" Grading
(Issue) (1) Students should be evaluated by some
systematic grading scale.
(2) Generally speaking, this grading 
procedure should be used.
3. Required Courses
(Issue) (1) Follow a degree program which has been
designed by professional educators.
(2) As a rule, students should follow this 
type of degree program.
As described in the section on scoring clearly stated 
disagree issues, each statement was determined to be sketchy, 
good, or very good and given a score ranging from ’•C to "5".
APPENDIX C
PRE-TEST OF THE SALIENCE 
OF TOPICS 
N= 53
Mean
________________Topic___________________________Salience Score
1. Has women’s liberation really helped
women? 15.61
2. What should be included in a liberal
college education? 18.94
3. Should we have an all volunteer
army? 17.21
4. Should Oklahoma City have a mass
transit system? 16.07
5. Should amnesty be granted to those
who dodged the draft or deserted in 17*88
order to avoid the Vietnam war?
^Each topic was evaluated using three semantic 
differential type scales. The bi-polar adjectives were: 
Significant-Insignificant, Important-Unimportant, and 
Relevant-Irrelevant. The possible range of scores for 
each topic was from "3" to "21" with a score of "21" 
indicating high salience.
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APPENDIX D
PRE-TEST OP AGREE-DISAGREE ISSUES
Group Receiving All Issues 
Clearly Stated 
N= 24
Issues^
Mean ^ 
Agreement Score
Mean 
Vagueness Score
Ethnic Studies Courses 3.96 5.63
Foreign Language Courses 2.79 5.50
Social Sciences Courses 5.79 6.33
Required Courses 2.58 5.88
Mathematics Courses 3.63 5.71
"A" to "P" Grading 2.66 5.75
Group Receiving Clearly Stated 
and Equivocated Issues 
N= 24
Issues^
Mean ^ 
Agreement Score
Mean 
Vagueness Score
Ethnic Studies Courses 4.52 5.08
Foreign Language Courses^ 4.45 4.88
Social Sciences Courses 5.44 5.84
Required Courses^ 4.25 5.32
Mathematics Courses 3.80 5.24
"A" to "F" Grading^ 4.13 4.92
The issues used in the pre-tests were also used in 
the actual experiment. See Appendix A for the wording of 
each of the six issues.
^Agreement with each of the issues was measured by 
a semantic differential type scale. Strongly agree- 
Strongly disagree were the bi-polar adjectives, and a score 
of "7" indicated strong agreement with the issue.
^Each issue was evaluated on a semantic differential 
type scale for vagueness, Vague-Specific were the bi-polar 
adjectives, and a soore of "7" indicated the issue was 
perceived as being stated specifically.
^Equivocated Issue
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t-Tests Between 
Clearly Stated Disagree Issues 
And Equivocated Disagree Issues
Agreement Vagueness
1.
2.
3.
Foreign Language Courses —  
Clearly Stated Disagree vs. 
Equivocated Disagree
1= 2.79 
X= 4.45 
t= 3.40^^
X= 5.50 
X= 4.96 
t= I.l6
Required Courses —
Clearly Stated Disagree vs. 
Equivocated Disagree
X= 2.58 
X= 4.25 
t= 3.52^^
X= 5.88 
X= 5.38 
t= 1.25
"A" to "P" Grading —  
Clearly Stated Disagree vs. 
Equivocated Disagree
X= 2.66 
X= 4.13 
t= 3 .00*^
.1= 5.75 
X= 5.04
t= 1 .6 5
Sum of the Disagree Issues —
Three Clearly Stated Disagree Issues 
Three Equivocated Disagree Issues
vs, X= B.o4 
X=12.79 
t= 5.35**
X=17.37
X=15.25
t= 2 .61^
♦Significant p <  .05 (2.01 with df=46 for a 2 tail test) 
♦♦Significant p< .01 (2.68 with df=46 for a 2 tail test)
APPENDIX E
PRE-TEST OF SOURCE CREDIBILITY 
N= 53
-Mean Mean ^
Source______ Competence Score Character Score
David Hall 13.87 12.24
Ralph Nader 16.6? 16.10
Paul Sharp 18.20 16.43
Richard Nixon 14.70 1 1 .56
Curtis Harris 11.87 11.30
E.K. Gaylord 14.24 12.72
^Three semantic differential type scales were used 
to measure competence* Intelligent-Unintelligent, Qualified- 
Unqualified, and Competent-Incompetent. The possible 
range for the competence score was from ’*3" to "21" with 
a score of "21" indicating a high competence rating.
^Three semantic differential type scales were used 
to measure character* Good-Bad, Reliable-Unreliable, and 
Just-Unjust. The possible range for the character score 
was from "3" to "21" with a score of "21" indicating a 
high character rating.
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APPENDIX P 
TREATMENT COEDITIONS 
Introduction and High Credible Source Condition
Recently a variety of individuals in the state of 
Oklahoma were surveyed and asked to respond to the questiont 
"What do you think should be included in a liberal college 
education?" Those surveyed were asked to make a formal 
statement expressing their personal beliefs on this subject.
The statement you will read was made by Dr. Paul Sharp, 
president of the University of Oklahoma. Dr. Sharp has 17 
years of experience as the head of college or university 
administration, serving as president of the University of 
North Carolina and Drake University before coming to O.U,
He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa as well as the Harvard 
Institute of College Presidents and is a highQcy recognized 
lecturer, making presentations to such internationally 
renowned institutions as the University of Melbourne and 
the University of Sydney in Australia. In addition. Dr.
Sharp is the author of several books and has written 
numerous articles and reviews for scholarly journals.
Introduction and Low Credible Source Condition
Recently a variety of individuals in the state of 
Oklahoma were surveyed and asked to respond to the questiont 
"What do you think should be included in a liberal college 
education?" Those surveyed were asked to make a formal 
statement expressing their personal beliefs on this subject.
The statement you will read was made by Curtis Harris, 
district attorney for Oklahoma County. Mr. Harris is known 
for his very conservative view of law and order, and in the 
last several years he has carried out a campaign to ban all 
forms of pornography in Oklahoma. He has gone so far as to 
try and make the selling of Playboy magazine a criminal offense. 
In addition, he contends that all first offenders found guilty 
of smoking marijuana should receive the maximum punishment, 
without exception. It should also be added that Mr, Harris 
has had very limited exposure to academic affairs or student 
activities on the university campus.
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Introduction and Unidentified Source Condition
Recentl:' a variety of individuals in the state of 
Oklahoma were surveyed and asked to respond to the questions 
"What do you think should he included in a liberal college 
education?" Those surveyed were asked to make a formal 
statement expressing their personal beliefs on this subject.
The statement you will read was made by one of those 
individuals contacted during the survey.
Treatment Message
What should be included in a liberal college education? 
This is a question that university administrators as well as 
students are greatly concnned about. There are many differing 
opinions I however, I personally feel that the fol^wing methods 
and courses should be included.
(Following this introductory paragraph the six issues 
and respective rationales were presented. They were not 
numbered and each was presented in a separate paragraph. The 
disagree issues were manipulated so that they were clearly 
stated or equivocated, and the order of the issues was either 
agree-disagree or disagree-agree. In total, there were 
twelve different treatment messages. After all six issues 
had been presented, the following concluding paragraph was 
presented.)
I feel that if these measures are followed, the student 
will more closely approach a meaningful and truly liberal 
college education.
APPENDIX G 
TIME ONE MEASURING INSTRUMENTS 
Introduction and Scaling Instructions
Please provide the following information;
1) Last 4 digits of your I.D. number 000-00__________
2) SexI Circle one —  male female
3) Classification__________
4) Section__________
5) Date__________
Please ^  not turn to the next page until the 
instructions for completing the questionnaire have been 
clarified,
We are currently taking a survey of speech students on 
the topic "What should be included in a liberal college 
education?" and we would appreciate your cooperation in this 
research effort. You will not be identified by name and your 
anonymous status is guaranteed. We are concerned only with 
the overall collection of student responses and not the 
beliefs of specific individuals. Your participation in this 
survey indicates a willingness to cooperate and help us with 
this research. Remember, there are no right or wrong answers, 
and you are encouraged to give us your honest opinion on all 
questions.
In answering the questions which follow you will be 
asked to respond to one or several bi-polar scales. For 
example, if you were to evaluate "Senator George McGovern" 
and you think he is very attractive, you would mark an "X" 
as below;
Senator George McGovern
Beautiful ; X ;___;____;_____ ;___ ;_____ ;____i Ugly
Homely ;_____ ;___;____;_____ ;___ ;_____ ; X ; Handsome
If you feel that he is quite unattractive, of course 
your "X" would be placed nearer to the "Ugly" pole and 
"Homely" pole. You may "X" on any of the 7 spaces depending 
on how you feel about the concept or question under consideration,
The middle space should be considered "neutral," Check 
this space if you feel that neither adjective applies to the 
concept or if you feel both adjectives apply equally to the 
concept.
Please answer all items and make only one "X" on each 
bi-polar scale,
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Agreement Index
Overall, how much dp you agree with the message you just 
read regarding what should be included in a liberal college 
education?*
Strongly agree i__ :
Right I__ :
Negative__ i___:
Good I__ ;
Foolish I t
 *____I
 *_____*
I I
* Strongly disagree 
I Wrong
* Positive 
: Bad
t Wise
*A score ranging from " I ” to ’*7" was given to each 
bi-polar scale. These scores were then summed to produce a 
possible range from "5" to •*35’* for the agreement measure 
with a score of "35" indicating high agreement.
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Recall Index
The last part of this questionnaire is very important. It 
is a test designed to see how well you comprehended the 
message on what should be included in a liberal college 
education. There were six main issues presented in the 
statement you read. Recall as many of these main issues 
as you can and in as much detail as possible.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
APPENDIX H
MANIPULATION CHECK GROUP MEASURES
High Credible Source Evaluation
Recently a variety of individuals in the state of 
Oklahoma were surveyed and asked to respond to the question: 
"What do you think should be included in a liberal college 
education?" Those surveyed were asked to make a formal 
statement expressing their personal beliefs about this 
subject. One of those asked to make a statement was Dr.
Paul Sharp, president of the University of Oklahoma. We 
are not interested in your evaluating his exact statement; 
rather, we want to know how you would rate this person 
addressing this topic.
Dr. Sharp has 1? years of experience as the head of 
college or university administration, serving as president 
of the University of North Carolina and Drake University 
before coming to O.U. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa as 
well as the Harvard Institute of College Presidents and is 
a highly recognized lecturer, making presentations to such 
internationally renowned institutions as the University of 
Melbourne and the University of Sydney in Australia. In 
addition. Dr. Sharp is the author of several books and has 
written numerous articles and reviews for scholarly journals.
On the following bi-polar scales evaluate the credibil­
ity of Dr, Sharp as a source addressing the topic "What should 
be included in a liberal college education?"
Dr. Paul Sharp*
Intelligent : 
Qualified : 
Incompetent : 
Good I 
Unreliable i 
Unjust I
: Unintelligent 
: Unqualified 
: Competent 
: Bad
: Reliable 
I Just
♦The first three bi-polar scales are the competence 
rating and the last three are the character rating. A score 
ranging from "1" to "7" was given to each bi-polar scale and 
then summed across each dimension. Each dimension had a 
possible range from "3" to "21" with a score of "21" indicating 
high credibility.
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Low Credible Source Evaluation
Another person asked to make a statement expressing 
what he thought should be included in a liberal college 
education was Curtis Harris, district attorney for Oklahoma 
County, As before, we are not interested in your evaluating 
his exact statement, but we want to know how you would rate 
this person addressing this topic.
Mr, Harris is known for his very conservative view of 
law and order, and in the last several years he has carried 
out a campaign to ban all forms of pornography in Oklahoma,
He has gone so far as to try and make the selling of Playboy 
magazine a criminal offense. In addition, he contends that 
all first offenders found guilty of smoking marijuana should 
receive the maximum punishment, without exception. It should 
also be added that Mr, Harris has had very limited exposure 
to academic affairs or student activities on the university 
campus.
On the following bi-polar scales evaluate the credibil­
ity of Mr, Harris as a source addressing the topic "What 
should be included in a liberal college education?"
Mr. Curtis Harris*
Intelligent : 
Qualified i 
Incompetent i 
Good I 
Unreliable t 
Unjust I
I Unintelligent 
t Unqualified 
t Competent 
I Bad
I Reliable 
I Just
*The saune procedure used in scoring the evaluation of 
Dr, Paul Sharp was used in evaluating Mr, Curtis Harris, with 
credibility being measured on the competence and character 
dimensions.
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Evaluation of Clearly Stated Agree Issues.
Clearly Stated Disagree Issues, and 
Equivocated Disagree Issues
Below you will find six statements collected from a 
variety of different individuals who responded to the question* 
"What do you think should be included in a liberal college 
education?" In contrast to the information you provided 
earlier, here we are not concerned with your evaluating the 
individuals who made these statements; rather, we want to 
know how you would rate these statements in terms of agree­
ment and degree of vagueness. Evaluate each series of state­
ments independently on the bi-polar scales below each state­
ment, indicating how much you agree with the statement and 
if you think the statement is clearly or vaguely worded.
(Conditions were randomly assigned to subjects in 
the check group. Half of the subjects individually evaluated 
the three clearly stated agree issues and the three clearly 
stated disagree issues while the other half individually 
evaluated the three clearly stated agree issues and the three 
equivocated disagree issues. Each issue was evaluated on 
two 7-point semantic differential type scales— one for 
agreement (Strongly agree-Strongly disagree) and one for 
perceived vagueness (Clearly stated-Vaguely stated). See 
Appendix A for the exact wording of the issues and supporting 
rationales,)
APPENDIX I
TIME TWO MEASURING INSTRUMENTS
Introduction and Scaling Instructions 
Please provide the following informations
1) Last 4 digits of your I.D. number 000-00__________
2) SexI Circle one —  male female
3) Classification__________
4) Section__________
5) Date__________
Please ^  not turn to the next page until the 
instructions for completing the questionnaire have been 
clarified.
Approximately two weeks ago you participated in a 
survey where you read and responded to a statement on the 
topic "What should be included in a liberal college educa­
tion?" The questionnaire we would like for you to complete 
today is the second part of this survey, As before, there 
are no right or wrong answers since this is an attitude 
survey, and you are encouraged to give us your honest opinion 
on all questions.
In answering the questions which follow you will be 
asked to respond to one or several bi-polar scales. For 
example, if you were to evaluate "Senator George McGovern" 
and you think he is very attractive, you would mark an "X" 
as below:
Senator George McGovern
Beautiful i X t___t____ :____ :____:____ i____i Ugly
Homely t_____ :___t____ i_____i____:_____i X t Handsome
If you feel that he is quite unattractive, of course 
your "X" would be placed nearer to the "Ugly" pole and 
"Homely" pole. You may "X" on any of the 7 spaces depending 
on how you feel about the concept or question under considera­
tion.
The middle space should be considered "neutral." Check 
this space if you feel that neither adjective applies to the 
concept or if you feel both adjectives apply equally to the 
concept.
Please answer all items and make only one "X" on each 
bi-polar scale.
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Agreement Index
Remember, if you can, the statement you read on what should 
be included in a liberal college education. Overall, how 
much do you now agree with that statement.*
Strongly agree : 
Right : 
Negative * 
Good ; 
Foolish »
: Strongly disagree 
t Wrong 
_» Positive 
! Bad 
I Wise
*The agreement measure was scored in the same manner 
as presented in Appendix G.
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Recall Index
There were six main issues presented in the statement you 
read approximately two weeks ago on what should be included 
in a liberal college education. Recall as many of these 
main issues as you can and in as much detail as possible.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
APPENDIX J
RESULTS OF MANIPULATION CHECK
Source Credibility Evaluation 
N= 20
Mean Mean
Source______ Competence Score Character Score
Paul Sharp 18,30 16.35
Curtis Harris 7«35 6,75
Note— The scales and scoring procedure used for 
the evaluation of source credibility are the same as 
those described in Appendix E,
Group Receiving All Issues 
Clearly Stated 
N= 10
Issues
Mean 
Agreement Score
Mean 
Vagueness Score
Ethnic Studies Courses 5.30 6.20
Foreign Language Courses 3.10 5.50
Social Sciences Courses 6,00 6,20
Required Courses 2,20 5 .6 0
Mathematics Courses 3.00 5.40
"A" to "F" Grading 1,30 5.70
Note— See Appendix D for the scales and scoring 
procedure used in measuring agreement and vagueness.
Group Receiving Clearly Stated 
and Equivocated Issues 
N= 10
Issues
Mean 
Agreement Score
Mean 
Vagueness Score
Ethnic Studies Courses 5 .5 0 5 .8 0
Foreign Language Courses^ 4,4o 4 ,3 0
Social Sciences Courses 5 .5 0 5 .5 0
Required Courses^ 4 ,6 0 6.10
Mathematics Courses 4 ,6 0 6 .3 0
"A" to "F" Grading^ 4.4o 5 .9 0
Note— See Appendix D for the scales and scoring 
procedure used in measuring agreement and vagueness.
^Equivocated Issues
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t~Tests Between 
Clearly Stated Disagree Issues 
And Equivocated Disagree Issues
Agreement Vagueness
1« Foreign Language Courses —  
Clearly Stated Disagree vs. 
Equivocated Disagree
X= 3.10  
X= 4.40  
t= 1.83*
X= 5.50  
X= 4.30  
t= 1.71
2. Required Courses —
Clearly Stated Disagree vs. 
Equivocated Disagree
X- 2.20  
x= 4.6o  
t=  3 .0 4 **
X= 5.60  
X= 6.10  
1= 0.72
3. "A" to "P" Grading —
Clearly Stated Disagree vs. 
Equivocated Disagree
x= 1.30
X= 4 .40  
t= 4 .8 7 * *
X= 5.70  
X= 5.90
0.29
4. Sum of the Disagree Issues —
Three Clearly Stated Disagree Issues vs. 
Three Equivocated Disagree Issues
X= 6.6o 
X=13.80 
t= 4.43**
X=16.80
X=16.30
t= 0.33
* Significant p <  .05 (1.73 with df=18 for a 1 tail test)
** Significant p <  .01 (2.55 with df=18 for a 1 tail test)
APPENDIX K
INTER-JUDGE RELIABILITY FOR 
QUALITY OF RECALL OP DISAGREE ISSUES
Time One 
N= 54
Judge 2 Judge 3
Judge 1 0.974 0.962
Judge 2 0.972
Equivocated Disagree Issues
Time One 
N= 54
Judge 2 Judge 3
Judge 1 0.949 0.953
Judge 2 0.930
Clearly Stated Disagre e Issues
Time Two 
N= 54
Judge 2 Judge 3
Judge 1 0.928 0.913
Judge 2 0.916
Equivocated Disagree Issues
Time Two 
N= 54
Judge 2 Judge 3
Judge 1 0.879 0.887
Judge 2 0.879
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